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"UN-LOCKE-ING" A "JUST RIGHT" ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIME: OVERCOMING THE THREE BEARS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALISM-SOVEREIGNTY,
LOCKE, AND COMPENSATION
ANNE C. DOWLING*
INTRODUCTION
[N]ature has its own methods of showing us its teeth, of
letting us know when we have transgressed limits. The
very land, air and water on which we rely begins to turn
sterile and toxic. The sum of our transgressions push
ecosystems and species beyond the threshold of adaptation,
and they begin to die and disappear. This sterility, toxicity
and extinction, in turn, degrades not only our natural
environment but also our economic prospects. It is because
of nature's sharp teeth that we must create laws and
institutions with sharp teeth of their own.I
The concept of "sovereignty" in international law and Lockean
theories respecting the rights of private property owners in domestic law,
would both appear to constitute an impenetrable barrier to the
development of environmental regulations.
For centuries, sovereignty has been "king," recognized as the sine
qua non of international law. The civil actions of states have focused only
on activities occurring within their own well-defined territorial borders.
Thus, the fact that historically, nations have not acted extraterritorially
when making environmental decisions should come as no surprise.
Traditional understandings of sovereignty have ascribed to that concept
the characteristics of unlimited freedom and absolute authority for each
state within its own territories. Sovereignty also, traditionally, has been
* Anne Dowling received her A.B. from Duke University in 1992, followed by an M.A.
in the History of Art from Williams College in 1994. She expects to earn her J.D. from
William and Mary School of Law in May of 2002. Ms. Dowling would like to thank
Professor Linda Malone for her advice on this Note and her mom, Marianne Dowling,
because she is wonderful.
I PAUL STANTON KIBEL, THE EARTH ON TRIAL: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL STAGE xxi-xxii (1999).
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interpreted to include exclusive control for the state over the natural
resources within its own borders. Thus, any overarching international
regulatory regime attempting to govern trans-boundary environmental
issues appears doomed to certain foundering on the shoals of sovereignty.
Just so, on the American domestic front, Locke's theories
respecting property have served as a key lynchpin of liberal democratic
governance and, as supplemented by Bentham's utilitarian philosophy,
have been uniquely resonant within American constitutional democracy.
And, as with sovereignty, these property theories have, over the years,
been assumed to arrogate to such owners the same degrees of absolute
control, authority, and freedom over their own lands as traditional
definitions of sovereignty have provided to states. Thus, any government
environmental regulations attempting to penetrate that doctrinal barricade
would seem destined to failure.
However, an effective regulatory system is in place in the United
States-the Lockean private property concept was in fact breached. How
did that happen? First, Lockean property principles turn out, upon
examination, never to have been as absolute as many interpretations
portrayed. Further, new philosophy, especially the public-trust doctrine,
American societal changes reflected in the domestic environmental
movement, and particularly the jurisprudence developed in the United
States on government land use restrictions under United States regulatory
"Takings" law, all contributed to the "taming" of Locke. It can hardly be
said that the American environmental regime has completely eradicated
the older "totalitarian" property rights concepts; in fact, as will be
discussed, those concepts are currently enjoying, in the United States, a
"comeback" fueled largely by the "compensation issue" in Takings law. 2
The American achievement does, however, offer reason for
optimism; that is, hope for similar environmental success on the
international front despite the apparent roadblock which sovereignty
represents.
Sovereignty, like the Lockean concept, also appears to have been
much more limited ab initio than apparent. Further, new philosophy, in
particular the "global commons" or "common heritage of mankind"
theories are now broadly coming to be recognized in international law, as
are new "enviro-friendly" usages of older principles of international law.
2 For a discussion of this comeback and its causes, see generally infra note 266,
particularly the works of William L. Inden and Richard Miniter. Additionally, the
appointment of Gail Norton, a well-known property rights advocate, as Secretary of the
Interior, may well give that comeback a great deal of extra political fuel.
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And again, as occurred in the United States, worldwide societal changes
are reflected in the international environmental movement.
Although there is, obviously, no set of international "statutes" like
those in the United States, there are a great number of treaties addressing
aspects of the subject, and there is a real possibility of developing clear
and effective enviro-jurisprudence thereunder and within the framework of
international law.
This Note will examine, in Parts I and II, the background and
development of both concepts of sovereignty and Lockean property rights
theory. It will then examine key factors that have led to the current
redefining of those concepts to include an implied recognition of the need
to answer to the "higher responsibility" of environmentalism. Neither
concept is now at all averse to environmentalism; in fact, both are
necessary-and can be significant-tools for the development of
successful international eco-legal systems. In Part III, this paper proffers
some suggestions as to how environmentalism can work with both
theories, and vice-versa, towards international environmental problem
solving and how the problems that have led to the current property-rights
backlash in America might be avoided on the international front.
I. SOVEREIGNTY
A. Background and Development
If we want to understand change and detect the emerging
dialects we need to break out of the constructs of
obsolescent paradigms. We will have to see beyond the old
order that is still guiding our tentative glimpses into the
baffling future . . . we will not see the new if we remain
hostages to the old context and its image of reality. It is
therefore important that we stretch our imagination, and
take a critical look at the conceptual apparatus that governs
our thinking.3
3 Matti Wouri, On the Formative Side of History: The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 159, 161
(Mats Roln, Helen Sj6berg & Uno Svedin eds., 1997).
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The concept of sovereignty is at the heart of the old order and is the
fundamental building block of international law.4 It is a concept that has
been firmly embedded in governing principles of international law since
1648:
Contemporary international law, is predicated upon the
international state system that grew out of the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years War in
Europe. Key to making this international political
arrangement work has been the notion of sovereignty, the
critical legal quality that endows a state with its own
autonomy and controlling influence, and that asserts the
state's freedom from external control ... 5
The theoretical underpinnings of traditional notions of sovereignty
can be traced to late medieval Europe. Jean Bodin's definition of
sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of a state" in particular
has continuing resonance and has been a foundational reference for many
ensuing theories on sovereignty: 6
Building on Bodin's definition, the term sovereignty was
conceived as an absolute concept implying that states are
totally independent with respect to the community of
nations as a whole and above the rules of international law.
Thus, later authors have held that sovereign states are
"perfectly independent totalities," that sovereignty is the
characteristic of a state to be legally bound only by its own
will, and that therefore, as a sovereign state is subject to no
will other than its own, it can never be bound by a legal
order. It was argued that a sovereign state has the complete
freedom to determine the extend [sic] of its rights and
obligations . . . . Under this perspective, sovereignty was
4 Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and the
Obligation not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVTL. L. 1187,
1188 & n.1 (1996).
5 ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY xxx
S1986).
JEAN BODIN, SECHS BOCHER OYBER DEN STAAT (BUCH I-III) 205 (P.C. Mayer-Tasch
ed., Bemd Winmer trans., 1981) (1576).
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understood as "complete freedom of a state from control by
any higher power claiming authority to regulate its acts."
7
Today, definitions of sovereignty have come to reject such
absolutism as having been void ab initio. Nevertheless, this older, more
"mythical" view still permeates much of the political and legal writing
proffered today.
Many writers still "essentially equate, sovereignty with
independence, the fundamental authority of a state to
exercise its powers without, being subservient to any
outside authority." Thus, governments still raise "the iron
curtains of sovereignty to resist international cooperation
and frustrate international norms." Sovereignty became the
"the cornerstone of international rhetoric about state
independence and freedom of action, and the most common
response to initiatives which seek to limit, a state's action in
any way is that such initiatives constitute an impermissible
limitation on that state's sovereignty."
8
In order to understand the pervasiveness of the "mythical"
absolutist definition of sovereignty, it is necessary to understand the
evolution of the term from the 16th through the 21st. centuries.
9
Sovereignty has undergone four phases-the 16th and 17th century
definition (defined by thinkers such as Bodin;. sovereignty means limited
independence); the classical 18th and 19th century definition (defined by
Hegel and Jellinek; sovereignty is defined as absolute and unlimited); the
traditional 20th century definition (defined by The League of Nations;
sovereignty adopts a relative/neighborly concept) and finally, the new
understanding of the late 20th and early 21st century (defined by the
United Nations and the growing general public awareness of global
problems; sovereignty takes on a more participatory role emphasizing
cooperation). 10
The concept of sovereignty was first espoused in the Middle
Ages-when Christianity and feudalism were supreme. Christianity
7 FRANZ XAVER PERREZ, COOPERATIVE SOVEREIGNTY: FROM INDEPENDENCE To
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 14-15
2000) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 16-17.
9For an in-depth discussion of that evolution, see generally id. from 17-67.
10 Id. at 344.
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embraced a global-world view in which religion, law and politics were
interdependent and interlocked. Sovereignty first emerged as a personal
concept describing the independence of the prince." Its origins were
political and only later became legal. The personal nature of sovereignty
was reinforced by the prevailing organizational system of the day-
feudalism.
[T]he liens of feudality, vassalage and personal allegiance
criss-crossing the universal Christian community living
under the roof of a divine order contradicted the idea that
law could be territorial .. .Thus . . . treaties between
commanders of an army, dukes and kings created only
personal relations, obligations and rights having larger
effects solely because of the duty of allegiance that existed
between rulers and their subjects."' 2
Social, agricultural, economic, scientific, and political changes
caused the slow collapse of the static feudal system and allowed the
concept of "territorialization" to emerge. This move towards
territorialization was enhanced by the rise of cities and the codification of
laws within those cities. No longer was the world-view one that was
governed by the divine will of the Creator. Rather, humans began to see
themselves as the center of the universe, and the universe was a "reservoir
of resources" ready for human consumption. 13 The Thirty Years War's
culmination in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 may be considered the end
of the medieval era and marks the beginnings of international law, in
which notions of state sovereignty were accepted as normative 14:
As the religious conflicts were the most fundamental
questions to be resolved, religious issues were a major
concern of the Peace of Westphalia. But at the same time,
it marked the beginning of a shift of paradigms in setting
the bases for transforming person oriented law into a
territory oriented law. Thus the political tensions were
settled by organizing Europe on the principles of
particularism, sovereign equality and balance of power.
1 OTro KIMMINICH, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS VOLKERRECHT 64 (6thed., 1997).
12 Id. at 57.
13 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 21 (internal citations omitted).
14 Id. at 19.
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And a system based on the coexistence of a plurality of
states exercising unlimited authority within their territories
was established.. .The independence of over three hundred
political entities was recognized, each with its own
principal, its own capital, its own bureaucracy ...This
significantly changed the pattern of international relations
in Europe and introduced a concept accepting the principle
of sovereignty .... This development paved the way from
the concept of a global order that was ordained by God to a
system characterized by the coexistence of free and
independent political entities. The understanding of the
international system as an universal and hierarchical order
kept together by a binding universal force was successfully
destroyed and the idea of the Empire was replaced with the
idea of the sovereign state.' 5
Nevertheless, it was broadly acknowledged at that time that
external sovereignty was not in fact absolute. Bodin and other l6th/17th
century thinkers, including the Westphalia peacemakers, understood
sovereignty as a limited doctrine-limited by both divine and natural law
and by concepts arising in international law, such as the Just War doctrine
limiting the authority of the state to launch war. 16 The freedom of the
state was understood to be subjected to the supremacy of the above
mentioned concepts. 17 Sovereignty as an "absolutist" concept was really
an internal concept, not an external one, designed to allow a state to
function internally and to manage its own affairs. "Thus, sovereignty had
the function of overcoming civil war and enable [sic] peace and welfare,
and the absolute character of (internal) sovereignty was seen as a
necessary means to reach this aim, and not an aim in itself."'18 Bodin and
other 15th and 16th century thinkers understood sovereignty as a limited
doctrine-limited externally by divine, natural and international law.
Jean Bodin's definition of sovereignty has thus been taken out of
context and distorted through a false application to the external affairs of a
state. When sovereignty is allowed to escape its internal restraints, it
15 Id. at 22-23 (internal citations omitted).
16 Id. at 344.
17 Id. at 38.
18 Id. at 39 (citing Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18
FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1685, 1687 (1995)).
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becomes a principle that is antithetical to environmentalism 19 and then as
Matt Wouri writes, the concept of sovereignty becomes a concept that
"ecologically makes no sense." 20 This distortion unfortunately still has
adherence; however, the myth of the unrestrained state is not supported by
sovereignty's genesis.
B. Sovereignty's Sea Change: The Adoption of the Mythical
Definition
This mythical definition would find increased application in the
19th and earlier 20th century classical phase of sovereignty. As the
concepts of divine and natural law withered on the vine, the idea of
absolutism again reared its ugly head:
The term sovereignty was extended further until it reached
in the 19th century an absolute content implying that states
are, with respect to the community of nations as a whole,
totally independent. This absolute conception of
sovereignty replaced the acceptance of international law as
binding and restricting the states and sovereignty as a
characteristic of the state was seen as the "highest
externally ...independent power free from any higher
authority." Thus, sovereignty degenerated into a principle
postulating the total independence and freedom from higher
21binding norms.
19A world of sovereign states is unable to cope with endangered-planet problems. Each
government is mainly concerned with the pursuit of national goals. These goals are
defined in relation to economic growth, political stability, and international prestige. The
political logic of nationalism generates a system of international relations that is
dominated by conflict and competition. Such a system exhibits only a modest capacity
for international cooperation and coordination. The distribution of power and authority,
as well as the organization of human effort, is overwhelmingly guided by the selfish
drives of nations. RICHARD FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND
PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL 37-38 (Random House, 1971).
20 Matti Wouri, On the Formative Side of History: The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 159, 163
(Mats Rol~n, Helen Sj6berg & Uno Svedin eds., 1997). "Ecologically speaking the
nation state-or any type of state-makes little sense." Id.
21 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 40.
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Thinkers such as Georg Freidrich Hegel and his student, Adolf
Lasson, built upon this absolute definition.22 According to them,
international law and sovereignty cannot coexist, because the egoistic self-
interest of the state excludes any possibility that it could subject itself to
the higher binding principles of international law.23 Consequently, the
state can never subject itself to a will other than its own and even treaties
are not seen as binding but merely as reflecting interest and power.
24
Hegel and Lasson intimate that sovereignty means that states are
unfettered by international law and deny the obligatory quality of
international law.
25
This extreme viewpoint was tempered by the writing of Georg
Jellinek. 26 Jellinek, by postulating the idea of auto or self-limitation,
sought to avoid the conclusions of his predecessors. 27 As maintained by
Jellinek, the state can bind itself and thus limit its freedom without loosing
its sovereignty because sovereignty encompasses the ability and right to be
bound exclusively through a state's own will. According to Jellinek, once
a state binds itself, it binds not only itself but also its subjects. Once
bound, only legal reason can free it from its commitment.28 Thus,
sovereignty does not equate to "unlimited power" and because sovereignty
embraces the concept of self-limitation, there is no contradiction between
it and international law.29 Jellinek's theory proved to be an indicator of
the definitions of sovereignty that would rise to the fore in the 20th
century.
C. From Myth to Reality
22 See GEORG WILHELM FREIDRJCH HEGEL, GRUNDZUGE DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS
1821); ADOLPH LASSON, PRINZUP UND ZUKUNFTDES VOLKERRECHTS 8 (1871).
3 See id.
24 LASSON supra note 22, at 22.
25 Martti Koskeniemi, Sovereignty: Prolegomena to a Study of the Structure of
International Law as Discourse, 4 KANSAINOIKEUS IUSGENTIUM 71, 71-72, 106 (Nos. ' ,
1987).
26 Concerning Georg Jellinek and his theory, see generally, HANS-PETER ALBERT, DER
STAAT ALS "HANDLUNGGSUBJEKT": INTERRPRETATION AND KRITIK DER STAATSLEHRE
GEORG JELLINEK, esp. 115-125 (1988).
27 GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 475 (3d ed., 1921); GEORG JELLINEK,
DIE LEHRE VON DEN STAATENVERBINDUNGEN 34 (Kipe Verlag, Goldbach 1996) (1882)
hereinafter STAATENVERBINDUNGEN].8 STAATENVERBINDUNGEN supra note 27, at 29.29 Id. at 36.
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It was not "mere" theories that ultimately undid the absolutist
underpinnings of sovereignty-it was war, specifically, World War I:
The horrors of the first World War underlined definitively
the limitations of the classical international law of
understanding sovereignty as unrestricted authority. As it
became apparent that the classical understanding of
sovereignty as absolute was a threat to the international
community, to international peace and to the maintenance
of independent nation states itself, a new understanding of
sovereignty and of international law emerged.3 °
After World War I, the idea that sovereignty included the absolute
freedom to engage in war was replaced by the prohibition of the threat or
use of force and an obligation to seek peaceful settlement of disputes.
3 1
This idea was codified in the Covenant of the League of Nations , later in
the Briand-Kellogg Pact's General Treaty for the Renunciation of War in
192833 and after World War II in the United Nations Charter.34 Current
writings emphasize the point that today the use of armed force and the
resort to war is largely prohibited.35 This, sovereignty became limited in
the sense that the unfettered right to initiate war was replaced by the
obligation to maintain peace.
36
More important, for the purposes of this paper, is the
"subjugation" of states to principles of international law. In reverse, this
can be viewed as the triumph and acceptance of a definition of sovereignty
in which states recognize their limitations and subject themselves
willingly to international law. This acceptance of substantial limitations
on states' freedom and independence and the willingness of states to
subject themselves to the rule of international law "may prove to be one of
the 20th century's more valuable achievements":
37
30 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 46 (internal citations omitted).
31 Thomas M. Franck, Three Major Innovations of International Law in the Twentieth
Century, 17 QLR 139, 139, 148-152 (1997) (positing that the outlawing of war is one of
the three major innovations of international law in the twentieth century).
32 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12-16.
33 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928.
34U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
35 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force, Legal Aspects, 10 EJIL 1, 2-3
1999) (arguing that prohibition of threat or use of force is part ofjus cogens).
6 KIMMINICH, supra note 11, at 75-82.
37 Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 GERMAN YIL 15, 24 (1993).
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The acceptance of the binding force of international law,
and the right to enter into binding international agreements
and to be a subject of international law was no longer seen
as a rejection or denial of sovereignty, but became the
fulfillment of state sovereignty. [This] . . . fact . . . is
underlined by the reality that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time." This
overwhelming compliance of the states with international
law is seen as evidence for their confidence in international
law and the existence of an international rule of law ....
Thus: the right to be a subject of-and to be subject to--
international law became a key element of international
sovereignty.
38
D. Sovereignty in the Modern Age-Friend not Foe
Sovereignty post-World War II underwent further significant
transformations. Perhaps the most significant "infringement" on
sovereignty arose out of the recognition of human rights. 39 These rights
were recognized in the United Nations Charter when it was supplemented
in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1966 by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,40 all three of
which combine to form what is known as the International Bill of Rights.41
Prior to this recognition, internal sovereignty was unquestioned-a state
it PERREZ, supra note 7, at 48 (2000) (quoting Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE
47 (2d ed., 1979)).
39 Brand, supra note 18, at 1693-94.
40 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 118-120 (2000). The emergence of human rights, only briefly
mentioned here, has had huge implications for international law in terms of the erosion of
sovereignty by allowing individuals and not just states to bring suits and as a tool
embraced by environmentalists. Thus, states were able to foster the idea that the right to
a clean environment is a human right. This is one of the theoretical bases for sustainable
development discussed infra. For an excellent discussion of Human Rights and the
Environment, see A. Boyle, The Role of International Human Rights Law in the
Protection of the Environment, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES To ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (A. Boyle & M. Anderson eds., 1996) (The discussion includes the pros and
the cons of tying the environment to human rights.).
41 STEINER & ALSTON supra note 40, at 121-122.
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could treat its nationals as it pleased. With the recognition of human
rights, not only was the relationship of individual to state revolutionized,
but state to state relationships were also changed.42 States now had to
answer to their own citizens and to other states for violations stemming
from the "International Bill of Human Rights."
• Perhaps no other, institution has had more influence on the decline
of. "the absolutist" aspect of sovereignty than the United Nations by
confirming a limited concept of sovereignty in which sovereignty must
"answer to" international law in UN Charter Article 2(2).43 Or, as Jost
Delbrtick so succinctly put it, the UN established the "definitive inroad
into the once sacred principle of sovereignty.
'
"
44
Case law supports the conclusion that sovereignty in the 20th
century includes a duty to respect other's sovereignty. 5  Thus, states
42 Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil •Rights: Considering "Third Generation"
International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L, REV.
387, 391 (1997) (positing that human rights law is an abrupt departure from the classical
understanding of international law as law between nations on two levels-first by
providing individuals with rights versus their own governments and then by allowing
other states or international organizations to intervene to enforce and protect these rights).
43 This may seem ironic, because the United Nations emphasizes sovereignty in terms of
dispute resolution (discussed in this Note infra), yet it embraces a definition of
sovereignty that would be unrecognizable to those scholars of the previous centuries who
viewed sovereignty as absolute independence:
The Charter not only introduced a new international system, it also
legally ascertained that sovereignty inherently includes the respect of
other's sovereignty and means freedom within and limited by
international law. This affirmed definitively the change of paradigms
that emerged after World War I: sovereignty as absolute independence
was replaced by a relative and limited concept. This change of
paradigms enabled... the emergence of principles... [that] ... would
have been incompatible with the classical approach basing international
law on a concept of sovereignty as absolute independence.
PERREZ, supra note 7, at 52.
44Jost Delbrilck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4
IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 283 (1997).
See generally PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH To INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RESPONDING To THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 61-123 (1998). Ms. Taylor in
Chapter 3 of her book illustrates this point by extended and detailed discussion of several
cases including: The Island of Palmas Arbitral Award (1928) (United States v.
Netherlands) 2 R. INT'L. ARB. AWARDS 829; El Salvador v. Nicaragua (Central American
Court of Justice) 11 A. J. INT'L. LAW 674 (1917); Trail Smelter Case (United States v.
Canada) 3 R. INT'L. ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1908); and, e.g., The Corfu Channel Case
(United Kingdom v. Albania) 4 ICJ Reports (1949); see also PERREZ, supra note 7, from
55-64 (in which he reviews a series of cases (some overlapping with Taylor) to illustrate
that:
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became constrained in the exercise of their sovereign authority by the
existence of the same sovereign authority in other states. This notion can
be extrapolated to include the idea of equality among states through
sovereignty (no matter how big or small a state is, its concerns must be
addressed), and the requirement of respect toward one's neighboring
sovereign state. In taking an action, a state is forced to weigh an opposing
state's interests and concerns; thus, a state can no longer act as it pleases,
but must take an accounting of its actions.46 If its actions are harmful and
it proceeds, the state will answer to the rest of the international
community. Thus, "sovereignty can only exist-and sovereignties can
only coexist-if sovereignty includes the -respect of the sovereignty of
others. Therefore . . . [the] neighborly approach sees the limitation of
sovereignty as an inherent element of sovereignty itself, enabling a
peaceful coexistence.
A7
Good neighbors do not trash one another's backyards, they work
together to ensure that the entire neighborhood remains tidy. If the
neighborhood is the entire earth, cooperation between states must be the
rule and not the exception. As we have demonstrated above, this good
neighbor definition has become this century's working definition of
sovereignty. It is against this definitional backdrop that the remainder of
this Note must be read.
E. Sovereignty Circumscribed
As discussed above, an overview of decisions "has demonstrated
that [it is] a constant and uniform practice of international arbitral courts,
Since the beginning of this century, international tribunals have
accepted in a long and constant practice that sovereignty is limited...
these decisions.. .illustrate the rejection of the classical theory of
unlimited sovereignty and the shift towards a neighborly approach on
which the 20th century . . . understanding of sovereignty is based.
These decisions also portray the typical characteristics of this
neighborly approach to sovereignty, i.e. the limitation of sovereignty to
state territory, the subjection of sovereignty to treaty law and general
international law, and the inclusion of the obligation to respect the
other's sovereignty in the principle of sovereignty.).
Id. at 55.
46 "The function of sovereignty is neither unrestricted nor unlimited. It extends as far as
the sovereign rights of other states . . . [A] state may not claim more than such
independence and liberty as is compatible with the necessary organization of humanity,
with the independence of other states, and with the ties that bind States together."
TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 64-65 (internal citations omitted).
PERREZ, supra note 7, at 65.
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the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of
Justice . . . have supported . . . and affirmed . . . the conclusion that
sovereignty is limited .... ",4 However, these decisions were not created
in a vacuum; they were supported by international legal notions and
concepts. A brief overview of several prevalent such notions and concepts
will demonstrate how they, as well as the case law as discussed above
have helped to circumscribe sovereignty. Key among those concepts are
developed and recognized customary law; the concepts known as the
"duty to cooperate," customary law, "sustainable development," and the
development of the theory of the "international commons" or the "heritage
of mankind.",
49
48 Id. at 60.
49 See generally Christopher C. Joyner & George E. Little, It's Not Nice to Fool Mother
Nature! The Mystique of Feminist Approaches to International Environmental Law, 14
B.U. INT'L. L.J. 223-266 (1996). With the exception of customary law, these concepts
are primarily considered "soft law." One of the problems that international
environmentalism must overcome is the fact that many of the international legal concepts
most favorable to fostering environmentalism can be found only in the form of soft law.
Soft law lacks the bite of hard law, and therefore is more easily ignored.
"Hard law" is represented by treaties, custom, and principles of international
law that mandate compliance by states and are enforced by procedures such as arbitration
or recognized by and enforceable through international tribunals. Some hard law
examples include: UN Security Council Resolutions (binding on all) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). NAFTA disputes are resolved with
binding arbitration. NAFTA is unique in that it is the first trade agreement to incorporate
environmental protections; unfortunately, however, the environment only plays second
fiddle to trade in general.
"Soft law" includes recommendations and resolutions of international
organizations, declarations of international conferences, which recommend, propose or
suggest but create no mandate and have no force of law. Some soft law examples
include: Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, e.g., the 1982 "World Charter for
Nature" which includes an affirmation by the General Assembly that "mankind is part of
nature and life depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural systems which ensure
the supply of energy and nutrients" (World Charter for Nations, GA Res. 37/7, Annex,
UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 17, UN Doc. A/37/5i(1983)) and incorporates
the recommendation that all states should avoid "activities likely to cause irreversible
damage to nature," but includes neither a mandate nor any specific directives to states re
how to identify such "activities." The Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management Conservation and Sustainable
Development of All Types of Forests." (Global Consensus on the Management
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, 4th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 9, at 2, UN Doc A/Conf. 151/6 (1992)). Although this sets out
certain general principles concerning managing and conserving forest resources, it merely
suggests that states "should" utilize the recommended procedures. No mandates or
penalties for failure to comply are included.
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The concepts discussed herein often arise in the context of treaties
and non-binding instruments. The last half of the twentieth century
witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of international treaties and
non-binding instruments covering an array of environmental issues. 50 The
mere presence of these instruments is indicative of not only the rising
importance of environmentalism, but also recognition that in order to
institute an environmental regime with a chance of success cooperation is
required between states. This need for cooperation first became apparent
in order to insure peace-and over the years, cooperation became the
fundamental principle in efforts of the states and the United Nations to
promote and ensure international peace.5 1
This duty to cooperate can also be found in the United Nations
Charter, specifically Articles 55 and 56.52 As found in the UN Charter, the
Feminists and others criticize "soft" international law as a tool, describing same
as "a system of empty promises that tantalizes ... with international aspirations.. .but one
that fails notably short on real results." Joyner & Little supra note 49, at 246-7. Their
criticism applies as well to "soft law" in respect to development of international
environmental law. "Soft law" resolutions, agendas and pronouncements on international
environmental issues are multitudinous, but there is a great deal less of "hard"
international environmental law. A right is nothing but a chimera to such feminists
unless backed up by such "hard law" aspects as legal implementation-enforceability,
access to procedural enforceability, and widespread support by decision/policy makers
(who many women point out are men). Such feminists point out that these results have
not occurred with respect to international environmental law and point toward male
priorities (emphasis on civil and political rights; de-emphasis on economic, social and
cultural rights) as the culprit. These feminists fear that the environment will occupy an
even lower rung on the male ladder of priorities. Id. at 256.These "declarations" of "rights" without force of law are useful tools and not
without merit. They: (1) highlight and publicize issues of broad concern; (2) indicate
consensus thinking of participants; (3) influence judicial decisions; (4) raise the
expectations of the public so as to deter potential violators; and (5) most hopefully, can,
over time, become actual tenets of international law through custom-see, for example,
Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ 12 (Oct 16) (ICJ holds that GA
declarations re de-colonization and self-determinism were an expression of a norm of
customary international law.). "Soft law" is therefore valuable and cannot be ignored
because of its potential. But currently, it is not yet capable of giving eco-globalism the
legal teeth it needs.
50 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xix-xl (1995).
It is well beyond the scope of this Note to examine in detail the plethora of environmental
treaties and instruments that have been created during the 20th Century.
51 See Alan James, The Principles of Co-operation: United Nations Peacekeeping, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 160, 172 (Vaughn
Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1994).52 UN CHARTER, arts. 55-56.
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duty to cooperate is too general to force states to do anything more than
adopt a cooperative attitude towards one another in their dealings. 3
However, it is argued that the UN General Assembly in the Declaration on
the Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among the States has reaffirmed
this duty.5 4 When expressed in this form, it is generally accepted that the
duty to cooperate is evidence of binding international law. 5  This Note
proceeds under the premise of its acceptance as binding. This acceptance
of the duty to cooperate has important implications for the development of
international environmental law and the role of the state.
Implicit within the duty to cooperate is the concept of good
neighborliness. This concept has been discussed supra in terms of
sovereignty, and is substantially similar environmentally, that is, "states
are under an obligation to prevent activities within their jurisdiction or
control from causing extra-territorial environmental harm.''56 If a state has
53 Rtidiger Wolfrum, Commentary on Article 56, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 793, 794 (Bruno Simma, et al. eds., 1994).
54U.N. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
55PERREZ, supra note 7, at 270 n.177.
56 See TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 65. There is debate as to whether or not this concept is
a principle of international law; however the majority of opinion seems to favor its
acceptance as such and case law only enhances this notion, see supra footnote 44
discussing the Trail Smelter Case. One concept that had the potential to scuttle eco-
globalism is the often cited notion of permanent sovereignty. Generally, permanent
sovereignty refers to the concept that a state has the right to decide freely and
independently about the use and exploitation of its own wealth and natural resources.
This right seems directly at odds with the duty to cooperate and the principle of good
neighborliness, however, if viewed in the proper historical context as a kind of economic
sovereignty concept created to help developing countries control their own resources,
then permanent sovereignty does not represent the stumbling block to international
environmentalism that it appears to at first blush. This is because "... it is well accepted
that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources underlined the states'
authority and jurisdiction over their natural resources 'without however exempting it
from the application of the relevant principles and rules of international law .... Thus
the principle of permanent sovereignty inherently includes the neighborly limitation... "
PERREZ, supra note 7, at 99-100. In short, permanent sovereignty cannot be used to
trump cooperation or neighborliness. See Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
from the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment as proof of this.
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.! at 3 (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/14 at 2-65, and Corr. 1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
Principle 21 says:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
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an obligation to control what it does within so as not to harm those outside
of its borders, its absolute authority is undermined. Its sovereignty can no
longer be said to be absolute. A brief look at the principle of customary
international law supports this proposition.
Customary norms are created by the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." 57 Customary law is considered "hard
law," which has more bite than soft law.58 The general requirement for
the emergence of an international customary rule is state practice coupled
with opinio juris-the subjective belief that the practice is obligatory.
59
The frequency or duration of the practice is not as important as the number
of states adhering to it-the greater the number, the stronger the argument
that a custom exists. Thus, "the more often the General Assembly recites
a principle, the greater the likelihood that legal expectations will be
created and a nation's behavior will be affected., 60 The implications for
international environmentalism can be expressed as follows:
There is extensive practice of international cooperation
concerning the protection of the environment and regarding
the use of natural resources .... And the fact that so many
international environmental treaties and conventions have
been adopted is also the result of intense cooperation. This
profound cooperation is accompanied by multiple
statements that the states are bound by a duty to cooperate.
. . the UN General Assembly has repeatedly affirmed the
desirability, necessity and obligation of international
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 21 has been re-affirmed and reiterated in a myriad of documents. TAYLOR,
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH supra note 45, at 75-78. Most notably in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, which was adopted in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro; But see Somendu Kumar Banjeree, The Concept of
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources-An Analysis, 8 IJIL 515 (1968)
(Banjeree argues that the concept of permanent sovereignty is not qualified by any
limitations of international responsibility). Indeed, today, it is understood that Principle
21, as codified in UN General Assembly Resolution 1996 (XXVII) (UN GA Res. 2996
(XXVII) of Dec. 15, 1972), reflects a general rule of customary international law.
PERREZ, supra note 7, at 102. The role of custom will be discussed infra.
57See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No. 993, Art.
38(1)(c).
58 See supra note 48 for a discussion of hard versus soft law.
59 See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BYIL 1 (1974-75).
60 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 278 (internal citations omitted).
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cooperation... Thus, the duty to cooperate, especially with
regard to the protection of the environment, is enacted not
only in many treaties, but it is also acknowledged and
affirmed by numerous non-binding instruments like
resolutions of the UN General Assembly or declarations of
UN Conferences... It can therefore be concluded that the
duty to cooperate, especially concerning environmental
issues, is today a principle of customary international law.
6 1
Customary international law supports the premise that via
cooperation the sovereignty of states has been sharply curtailed. Further,
customary international law, as "hard law," provides eco-globalism with
the beginnings of a set of teeth that have the potential to become quite
sharp.
Sustainable development is another concept broadly recognized in
International law and supported by both free marketers and environmental
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). The concept of sustainability
emerged in the early 1980's and stresses the need to reconcile and
integrate environmental and developmental goals in order to ensure human
survival. Sustainable development is based on the idea that "human
progress must conform to basic ecological precepts and human needs in
order to endure." 62 Sustainable development received widespread notice
and immediate acceptance with the publication of Our Common Future by
the World Commission on Environment and Development, 63 which defined
sustainable development as development that "meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs . ,64 Thus, sustainable development stands for the idea
of responsible development, recognizing that development is inevitable,
yet, subjecting developers to a duty to maintain a viable environment for
the future. Perhaps most importantly, sustainable development as a
concept requires interaction and cooperation between states in order to be
achieved. States, the traditional actors on the international law scene, have
recognized this in the formation of numerous "bilateral, regional and
global declarations, decisions and agreements affirming the principle of
61 Id. at 278-79 (quoting SANDS, PRINCIPLES, supra note 49, at 198).
62 Id. at 284.
63 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
1987).
4 Id. at43.
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sustainability.' '65  In the beginning, the concept of sustainability was
applied to discrete activities, however, recent documents embracing
sustainable development stress the "interconnected nature of
environmental problems ' 66 requiring a more integrated approach-not
only between the environment and development/industry, but between
states. Thus:
The concept of sustainable development "holds promise for
a new form of international law. It has the potential to
transcend traditional boundaries, which hold the rights of
individual nation states as virtually sacrosanct."
Sustainable development can modify the concept of
exclusive territorial sovereignty by making clear "that
nations have primary but not exclusive control over
resource decisions with extraterritorial impacts and that
nations owe duties to the international community." It
"emphasizes the need for more equitable relations among
and within nations and generations and the need for global
partnership" and thus places a growing importance on
cooperation to deal with the problems of environmental
degradation and economic development, problems, which
are increasingly understood as collective problems.67
According to most modem International law scholars the principle
of sustainable development, which began as a non-legally binding
statement, has gained enough widespread acceptance to be accepted as
customary international law. 68  As customary international law,
sustainable development has the teeth needed to give an international
environmental regime a bite as big as its bark.
Lastly, the concept of the international commons or the "common
heritage of mankind" ("CHM") is beginning to make important inroads in
65 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 286.
66 Id. at 287.
67 Id. at 288-89. Perrez cites Dan Tarlock for the idea that "the principle of sustainable
development can provide a rationale for eliminating deeply entrenched per se rules and
form the basis . . . for new intellectual property rights regimes that create global
incentives..." Id. at 289 n.297.
68 See, e.g., Catherine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity Conservation
Under International Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 777 (1995) (arguing that
international obligations and rules related to international environmental law now
encompass the concept of sustainable development).
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international thinking. As Prue Taylor writes, "CHM raises some
interesting prospects for overcoming, the problems associated with
sovereignty" she continues that if CHM were a working principle, "states
would retain sovereignty... but would be obliged to exercise sovereignty
in a manner consistent with the common interests of all humanity. ' 9
CHM is not a new concept; it has been in existence for almost half a
century. 70 Its, most recent definition stems from a speech made by UN
Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta in which he proposed a "declaration
recognizing the sea-bed and ocean floor ,resources, beyond national
jurisdiction, as the 'common heritage of mankind.'" 7  Today, this notion
extends to other realms, such as outer space and Antarctica. 72 According
to Perrez the principle of common heritage of mankind embraces the
following objectives and elements73:
The principle of common heritage of mankind embraces the
following objectives and elements: it internationalizes the
interest in, the authority over and the benefits of a certain
issue, it reserves the issue for future generations, and limits
the use of certain resources for the benefit of mankind and
for peaceful purposes ... an area or resource that has been
internationalized ...can't be appropriated by states or
individuals. Furthermore, the principle of common
69 TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 295.
70 Id. at 259.
Id.
72 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 293. Perrez tells a slightly different story concerning the
actual origins of the phrase, attributing it to President Truman; however, the thrust of his
argument conceptually mirrors that of Ms. Taylor's.
73 CHM is generally accepted as a principle of customary international law. Id. at 294;
however, the exact definition and resulting legal responsibilities stemming from that
definition have been questioned. For example, Prue Taylor mentions a potential threat
from property rights advocates to convert CHM from a potentially liberating global legal
principle stressing cooperation into one that actually reinforces sovereignty and property
rights. She writes, in sum, that property rights advocates have transformed the idea of res
communes from the notion of "open to all" into the notion of "property of all." If the
latter definition, infused with the notion of ownership, is accepted, "It could . . .be
dangerous: if the common heritage of mankind is owned it can be used and abused by the
owners... " She goes on to say that, "Until this contention is resolved, CHM may be
left to languish, leaving its true potential as a useful principle of international law
unrealized." TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 270-71. When defined by property rightists,
CHM smacks of early definitions of permanent sovereignty. It is interesting to note, yet
well beyond the scope of this paper, that it is the developing nations, those same nations
concerned with permanent sovereignty, who are advancing the property rights definition.
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heritage calls for international management, i.e., for
international cooperation in the efforts to. use and preserve
such areas or resources. Hence, recognition that certain
areas, issues or resources are a . . .common heritage of
mankind of common concern to all states and peoples
undercuts the traditional understanding of sovereignty and
permanent sovereignty . . . .The principle of common
heritage thereby makes it clear that the "states will
increasingly be required to take into account the needs of
all members of the international community... ."74
CHMvI offers perhaps the greatest hope of turning sovereignty on its
head without eliminating it completely; that is, states could still maintain
authority over their resources, but would be required to keep a greater
global good in mind when making decisions affecting such. As Prue
Taylor writes, "CHM raises, some interesting prospects for overcoming the
problems associated with sovereignty., 75 She then outlines four separate
approaches for using CHM as the basis for addressing environmental
concerns, all of which affect sovereignty, but in varying degrees - from
the relatively benign, to the truly radical. Even in the most benign form,
states would be "obliged to exercise sovereignty in a manner consistent
with the common interests of humanity" and with growing concern for the
protection of the global environment.76  Of the secondary form, Ms.
Taylor writes:
It encourages states to perceive the existence of one shared
global environment and to recognize that activities
undertaken in the name of. an exercise of sovereign
jurisdiction can no longer be conducted in a self-interested
fashion, but carry with them a global environmental
responsibility . . . . If this process should emerge, it is
possible that... CHM would form part of a transition from
sovereignty to a new international order.77
Sovereignty is eroded by the psychological shift from selfish
sovereignty to the acknowledgement that ecologically speaking a state is
74 PERREZ, supra note 7, at 294 (internal citations omitted).
75 TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 295.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 296.
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not an island unto itself, but part of a larger global community.
Sovereignty is maintained however in terms of management (see further
discussion infra). In addressing global environmental issues, decision-
making would occur at the international level but implementation would
be accomplished at the local level. As Ms. Taylor writes, "In this case
rational management might involve international management criteria
decided by the international community as a whole or by a decision-
making institution, and implemented at the international, regional and
national level by states according to their own policies... Such a regime.
does implement the fundamental principle 'think globally and act
locally. 78
Again, psychologically speaking, CHM offers a model for phasing
in a paradigm shift. Ms. Taylor offers four different CHM regimes;
however, if viewed as part of a four stage plan rather than four different
regimes, CHM would offer the perfect way to slowly make states view
themselves less as sovereigns and more as members of a connected global
community.
79
Thus, sovereignty is not inherently adverse to environmentalism at
the global level. As discussed in Section III, sovereignty in its current
form can serve as a tool to implement a new global environmental regime.
II PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Lockean Property Rights Theories-Background
If John Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government80 ("Second
Treatise") seems tailor-made for the American Founding Fathers, it may
well be because he wrote it for the primary purpose of validating the
English Revolution of 1688, which overthrew the Stewart King, James II,
and installed William of Orange and his wife, Mary, on the English
throne. Indeed, dedication of the Second Treatise includes Locke's
statement that the work was intended to "establish the Throne of our Great
Restorer, our present King William, to make good his Title in the Consent
of the People.",
81
78 Id. at 296-97.
79 See generally TAYLOR, supra note 45, chap. 6.
80 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 137 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1980)
1689).
I Id., Dedication.
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• Of Puritan background, Locke naturally tended to support the
Parliament against the King, and, although he was not physically active in
the various plots and machinations characteristic of that period of English
history, his respective mentors were accused of direct involvement and the
suspicion of the court also therefore reflected; onto Locke. In 1683, he left
England for the safety of Holland, which was at the time the destination of
choice for many who fled other spots in Europe hoping to enjoy more
freedom of thought and association with like minded individuals. Never
attracted by the intricacies of theological arguments or the dogmatic
aspects of religion, he was instead an ardent defender of religious
tolerance. He was not opposed to a state religious establishment, so long
as it was capable of avoiding dogmatic impositions and sponsored only the
most basic and simple tenets of Scripture.8
Living as he did in an age when principles of toleration and
democracy were locked in combat with the notion of the divine right of
kings, it is perhaps not surprising that his First Treatise on Government
concerned itself largely with the refutation of the latter notion and the
promotion of religious tolerance. 83 The First Treatise was a response to
the Hobbesean view that men required an all-powerful ruler to protect
themselves against their own selfish tendencies to seek power and to fear
others.8 4 Hobbes posited that without strong sovereigns men's lives would
therefore be "poor, nasty, brutish and short.",85 The divine right of kings
had also been ardently supported in Robert Filmer's theories of absolute
monarchy and the divine right of kings.8 6 Locke's First Treatise directly
attacked Filmer's theories. Locke elaborated later, explaining that
subjects have a God-given duty to obey rulers, but that a ruler's
sovereignty is not God-given, nor absolute, and is conditioned by duties to
his subjects. Resistance to the sovereign's commands, therefore, may be
justified if those commands do not justify obedience.8 7 Obviously the First
Treatise would only have been found most appealing to American
Revolutionaries.
82 See generally MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY (Frank N. Magill, ed., 1990)
(hereinafter MASTERPIECES]; JOHN DUNN, JOHN LOCKE (1984).
Id.
84 Id.
85 MASTERPIECES, supra note 82, at 395 (discussing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR
THE MATTER, FORM AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL
I1651)).
6 DUNN, supra note 82, at 9, 41 (discussing ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHIA (1680)).
87 Id. at 44-52.
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But it is his Second Treatise that most strongly resonated with
Americans because it virtually defined for them the civil ideals of liberal
democracy. In his Second Treatise, Locke posited that man, by nature,
had certain innate rights that pre-dated the existence of any state
governments, primary among them being life, liberty (meaning political
equality), and the ownership of property.88 The only essential function of
government therefore was to ,protect these natural rights. Men were
entitled to rid themselves of governments that did not effectively perform
these essential functions.8 9
American thinkers enthusiastically espoused Locke's theories
during the Revolution and the later adoption of the Constitution as
amended by the Bill of Rights:
90
In the Declaration of Independence, the American colonists
proclaimed that men had natural rights granted them by
their Creator, that governments were instituted by men with
their consent to protect these rights. Locke ... held these
rights to be life, liberty, and property, whereas the
Declaration proclaims them to be life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. It is interesting that Jefferson
pondered whether to use "property" or "pursuit of
happiness" and in an earlier draft actually had the former
set down. Much of Locke's discussion in this [second]
treatise influenced the statesmen and leaders of the
Colonies during the period of the American Revolution
9 1
Further, as Whittemore puts it:
All men, Locke had declared, are entitled to life, liberty,
and property and in approving the changing of this last to
read "pursuit of happiness" the sponsors of the American
Declaration of Independence intended no slight to the
inalienable right of property. All were men of means, and
of those among them who a decade later assembled at
Philadelphia to write a constitution for the American States,
88 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
89 Id. at 330-31.
90 MASTERPIECES, supra note 82, at 269.
91 Id.
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-there was hardly a man whose political philosophy was out
* of tune with... Locke.
92
Jefferson himself, discussing the methodology he used in preparing
the American Declaration of Independence, ties Locke directly to the
American psyche., Jefferson states that he was not trying to write a
document made up of his own creative new; ideas, but rather:
Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor
yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it [the
Declaration] was intended to be an expression of the
American mind, and to give to that expression the proper
tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority
rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day,
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed
essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke.93
Arthur Lee's comments are typical of the thinking of the time. He
opined that, "The right of property... is the guardian of every other right
and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of every other
liberty." 9
Among the Founding Fathers, many, like Lee, feared any power
that might allow government to impinge on their property rights. Many
also feared that such rights might be threatened by their own less fortunate
fellow citizens. Thus, they viewed "too much democracy" as an invitation
to repression by the majority--or to the redistribution of property, the
major wealth source in America at the time. John Adams'
recommendations that power be reserved to land holders indicate a firm
conception of property and liberty as so closely associated as to be
interdependent. He wrote, "[t]he moment the idea is admitted into society,
that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a
92 ROBERT C. WHITTEMORE, MAKERS OF THE AMERICAN MIND 118-19 (Books for
Libraries Press 1971) (1964).
93Id. at 147 (quoting XVI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 118-1 19 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1903).
94 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1992) (quoting ARTHUR LEE, AN
APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PRESENT
DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (1775)).
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force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny
commence."
95
Property rights have thus segued in America from one of man's
inherent natural rights to his most essential and primary right in civil
society-and his only real guarantee of liberty. "As heirs of Locke, then,
for us property also means liberty, in particular liberty from intrusion by
the government." 96 As James W. Ely, Jr. rather succinctly put it, "it is
difficult to overstate the impact of the Lockean concept of property."
97
These notions still resonate deeply within the American
consciousness despite the vast changes in the social, legal, philosophical,
and political sciences that have occurred since the late 18th century. None
of these changes have "as yet ... shaken the popular force of the idea of
property as a limit to the legitimate power of government.
' 98
The impact of Locke's ideas on American conceptions of the
relationship between man and land has substantially affected the currently
ongoing intellectual, social, and legal debates focused on identifying the
essential ethical ingredients that should serve as the framework of a sound
regime for the handling of environmental issues. The most essential
element to the formulation of a particular human ethic is the nature of the
subject thereof-and its true relationship to man. Locke's thinking,
influenced by Descartes dualism, 99 separates man from nature, gives man
dominion over nature and suggests that man's best use of nature is its
exploitation to his own ends.' 00 It is an entirely anthropocentric value, as
95 WHITTEMORE, supra note 92, at 131 (quoting VI THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 9
1851)).
6 Zev Trachtenberg, The Takings Clause and the Meanings of Land, in SPACE, PLACE &
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 63, 73 (Andrew Light & Jonathan M. Smith eds., 1997).
97ELY, supra note 94, at 17.
98 Trachtenberg, supra note 96, at 73 (quoting Jennifer Nedelsky, American
Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 263 (Jen Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988)).
99 "It is necessary for a gentleman in this learned age to look into some of [the various
writers on natural philosophy] to fit himself for conversation: but whether that of
Descartes be put into his hands, as that which is most in fashion, or it be thought fit to
give him a short view of that and several others also . . . " John Locke, Some Thoughts
Concerning Education 193, in XXXVII THE HARVARD CLASSICS 9, 165 (Charles W.
Eliot ed., 1938).
100 Even the concept of "sustainable development" currently in vogue as a workable
solution to environmental problems, places man as the numerator in the man/nature
equation and stresses that nature should be saved for man's sake, not for its own sake.
For a further discussion of this, see Anne C. Dowling, From Rachel to Rio:
Ecofeminism's Political Potential (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
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it ascribes no benefit to nature other than its utility to man. A Lockean
land ethic would also imply the absoluteness of the rights of the property
owner and his dominatory relationship to the environment.
Although Lockean philosophy clearly supports the notion of land
as personally owned and beloved, 10 i.e., the notion of a deep and
sentimental attachment to one's own land' 02 -the primary Lockean
concept is that land is a commodity, and fungible.
For Locke, the individual acquires land by working it-mixing his
sweat with the soil so to speak. He has a duty to develop it. Locke sees
land as the natural source of wealth for man; however, he deems it
naturally unjust for one to amass too much land; thus, the real source of
wealth derived from land is, for Locke, the owner's opportunity to
exchange the perishable items land produces for more durable forms of
wealth - the most durable of which, to Locke, was money. Thus, a man:
Might heap up as much of these durable things as he
pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just Property
not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the
perishing of any thing uselessly in it ... and thus came in
the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep
without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would
take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable
Supports of Life. 03
As Trachtenburg writes:
As C.B. MacPherson argues, Locke valorizes the making of
profitable exchanges as the clearest evidence of rationality,
hence, as the fulfillment of God's intentions for human
beings. The meaning of land emerges from this broad
conception: for Locke, land means the possibility of
producing value for use in exchange. That is, for Locke,
101 Land's meaning as personal property is "knotted to Locke's labor theory of property."
Trachtenberg, supra note 96, at 71.
102 Margaret Jane Radin nicely describes this type of land value: "the scene of one's
history and future, one's life and growth ... one embodies or constitutes oneself there."
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 992 (1982).
103 LOCKE, supra note 88, at 300-01.
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ultimately land means fungible property-it is to be
understood as a commodity.
1 0 4
Although Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian theories were not published
until about a century after Locke's works, Locke might be lumped with
the utilitarians in some respects, particularly in their focus on the
man/nature relationship as one of control and domination by man and the
resultant concept of land as fungible commodity.
For the utilitarian, the utility of objects, including natural objects,
lies in their ability to produce pleasure, good, or happiness-or prevent the
reverse. Man is governed by two overwhelming motivations-pleasure
and its reverse, pain. The goal of government therefore should be to
produce "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."'10 5 Because
utilitarians view nature through the same anthropocentric lens as Locke,
they also see the environment as a tool for men's use, though perhaps with
a broader notion of the possible uses man might make of his environment.
But it should be noted that, as with sovereignty, interpreters of
Locke were likely to put their own "spin" on his thoughts, taking those
parts most useful for their own ends or even unwittingly rationalizing
toward their own pre-conceived notions. Viewed as a whole, in reality,
Locke's property theories are a great deal less "absolutist" than many
interpretations thereof would have them. First, his world was ruled by
God at the top-man's duties to God were sacrosanct, and certainly Locke
would have put them above all things. Second, "love thy neighbor" was a
tenet Locke would have been thoroughly familiar with and avoidance of
the creation of harm to the property or health of one's neighbor falls
clearly within that simple rule. Nuisance law would doubtless, therefore,
have made great sense to him. Further, land held in common for grazing
was a feature of the Lockean countryside, thus community-oriented
property rights could not have been foreign to him. Last, as the good
husbander of property he recommended a man be, he would undoubtedly
have espoused the notion of sustainable development-just as sovereignty
has done.
B. American Environmentalism
104 Trachtenberg,, supra note 96, at 70 (quoting C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 221-38 (1962) (footnote omitted)).
105 See generally MASTERPIECES, supra note 82.
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The environmental movement in America resulted in deeply
significant changes in national views on property rights. American
environmentalism is a relatively new movement, its first real roots having
been established only in the late 19th century.10 6 Although some of its
inspiration came from the works of earlier 19th century writings such as
Emerson's Nature (1836) and Thoreau's Walden (1854) (both of which
extolled the importance of nature to individuals as a source of spiritual
refreshment and emphasized the notion that man is one with, rather than
apart from, nature), 107 the "first wave" of the American environmental
movement began in the late 1800s with the- growing interest in the
preservation of wilderness areas for the pleasure and enjoyment of
humans. 1
08
The United States had expanded Westward through vast tracts of
land with seemingly inexhaustible resources. It was not until the
nineteenth century that a realization of exhaustibility began to spread:
Environmental concerns in some sense date back in
American history to before the turn of the twentieth
century, particularly to reactions to what from the 1880s
into this century people saw as settlement and population
moved westward ... forests being clear-cut for timber and
left bare, grazing land being overused for sheep or cattle
and left naked.'0
It was at this time that conservationism and preservationism began
to take hold in the American consciousness. 110 Men like Gifford Pinchot,
106 For a brief overview of the development of American environmentalism, see CLARE
PALMER, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1997).
107 Id. at 32, 35.
108 "Commentators often describe the environmental movement.., as having occurred in
waves. The first wave grew out of the preservation and conservation movements of the
1890's and was marked by the efforts of John Muir, Theodore Roosevelt and other
outdoor enthusiasts to protect American wilderness." Robert R. M. Verchick, In a
Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 23,
38 (1996) (footnote omitted).
109 Steven Kelman, Moral Domains, Economic Instrumentalism, and the Roots of
Environmental Values, in ENVIRONMENTAL RISK, ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, AND
POLITICAL CHOICES 35 (John Martin Gillroy ed., 1993).
110 "The most successful area of environmental initiatives before the mid-twentieth
century was undoubtedly the preservationist-conservationist ethic of Teddy Roosevelt,
Gifford Pinchot and other mavericks." Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A
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the first head of the United States Forest Service, championed
conservation as the antidote to exhaustion of resources, urging slower
usage of resources like timber; that is, usage no faster than would be
consistent with a forest's ability to regenerate itself."'
The other major strand in first wave environmentalism, which
paralleled conservation, was the concept of preservation.' 1 2 The chief
spokesman of which was John Muir. 13 Although the first national park-
Yellowstone-was created in 1872,114 Yosemite, Sequoia and General
Grant National Parks were created in 1890, largely due to the efforts of
John Muir, a naturalist whose prolific writings were strongly influential in
raising public and political interest in wilderness preservation." 5 Muir
was keenly attracted to the aesthetics of unspoiled wilderness and focused
his energies on encouraging support for the preservation of such
untouched areas, looking to the federal government as the likeliest
candidate to serve as savior of such locales. "God had cared for these
trees and saved them from all manner of natural disasters. But 'he cannot
save them from fools, only Uncle Sam can do that."'
116
Muir's views represented a distinct departure from previous
American values respecting wilderness. American historical and cultural
roots were entrenched in the conquest and domination of nature, first for
survival and later for growth and development; thus, in America, untamed
wilderness was traditionally seen as wilderness that people had not yet
defeated or brought under useful and productive human control. 1 7 As
Casperson pus it, "The frontier mentality of a land of infinite resources,
where one could make a mistake and move onto fresh ground, led to a
vision of our resources as disposable."' 118 She goes on to posit that as the
Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 996 (1994).
III See Robert Cameron Mitchell, From Conservation to Environment Movement, in
GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 81, 84 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989).
112 Plater, supra note 110, at 996.
113 FREDERICK TURNER, REDISCOVERING AMERICA: JOHN MUIR N His TIME AND OURS
198 5 ).
14 PALMER, supra note 106, at 24.
115 "By the time Muir died in 1914... he was a man with a well known face. And he
had become a well known symbol for an alternative set of values about what made life
worth living." Kelman, supra note 109, at 36.
1161 TURNER, REDISCOVERING, supra note 113 (quoting Muir (citation omitted) at 311).117 Kelman, supra note 109, at 36.
118 Anna R.C. Casperson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of "Takings"
by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L.REV. 357, 365 (1996).
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reality of the possibility of exhaustion and depletion began to set in,
Americans were faced with the "Tragedy of the Commons."' 9
Muir founded the now very large and well-known Sierra Club in
1892 with 184 members, guiding. and nurturing it until his death in
1914.120 Other environmentally oriented groups such as the National
Audubon Society, which was founded in 1905, soon formed thereafter.
12 1
If Muir was the icon of the first wave of environmentalists, Rachel
Carson was equally revered by the second wave. Her book Silent Spring,
published in 1962, was broadly and immediately- influential.122 Pesticide
controls and the banning of DDT were significant results, but, more
importantly,. Silent Spring and other books Carson wrote helped to raise
the public's general level of ecological consciousness., 23  Even more
importantly, Silent Spring fell on the most fertile soil possible-the world
of 1960s American citizen activism:
Silent Spring, an essentially scientific disquisition, found a
remarkably broad, energetic, and engaged public audience.
In the 1960s citizens had suddenly begun to discover
themselves, thanks to the civil rights movement, Vietnam,
Ralph Nader's consumerism and the media ... the citizens
grabbed Silent Spring and ran with it.'24
The second wave, fueled by that citizen activism, which continued
during the 1960s and 1970s, quickly spread into existing United States
119 See, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (a
famous and oft-cited piece in which Hardin cogently argues that with respect to property
held in common--or in this American scenario-property that seems to be available for
everyone, no one user has an incentive to conserve same, and each has an incentive to
maximize his own use, as if one restrains his own over-use, another will make additional
demands on the property for his immediate benefit; thus, property held in common is
likely to be exploited to depletion level).
120 PALMER, supra note 106, at 33-34.
121 Id. at 148.
122 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
123 "The publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 led to an immense public
outcry against pollution. This outrage sparked a mass mobilization drive that resulted in
cleaner air, rivers, and lakes for many Americans [and] euphoria over the new
environmental consciousness sweeping the country .. '."'Dorceta E. Taylor, Women of
Color, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism, in ECOFEMINISM: WOMEN, CULTURE,
NATURE 38, 39 (Karen J. Warren ed., 1997).
124 Plater, supra note 110, at 1000-01.
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environmental associations 125 and eventually resulted in the body of
federal and state law currently governing our environment.
126
Second wave environmentalism had much broader concerns than
the preservation/conservation of the wilderness that had been the chief
focus of the first wave. Although those interests remained strong, health-
related issues, such as air pollution and toxins in waterways, became very
important as well. Another type of broadening also marked this wave-
people began to think in terms of the dangers to earth itself that might lurk
in thoughtless conceptions of, or treatment of, the environment. There
"appeared . . . during the 1960s and 1970s ... a more apocalyptic
apprehension about ecological balance ... concern spread that because of
untrammeled industrialization we were destroying the entire planet...
[T]here were worries about 'limits to growth' and 'zero population
growth. '"
127
Over the last forty years, environmentalism has woven itself into
our societal fabric, making itself heard in manners as diverse as the simple
recycling and water/fuel conservation steps taken at home by millions of
individuals; a plethora of local "grass roots" operations focused on a
singular issue such as cleaning up a toxic river or preserving a particular
wetlands area and Ralph Nadar's Green Party campaign in 2000. Second
wave environmentalism was also characterized by. the rapid growth of
existing environmental associations such as the Sierra Club and the
foundation of many new environmental associations or centers focused on
particular concerns or methodologies, such as the George Perkins Marsh
Institute founded on the original Earth Day in 1970 as a center for
scientific ecologists interested in working on discrete environmental
projects with a sound ethical basis; the Environmental Defense Fund,
founded in 1967, which takes an activist stance within the United States
legal framework by lobbying and bringing lawsuits on environmental
issues; and the World Wildlife Fund, founded in 1961, which focuses on
the preservation of biodiversity, sustainable development of resources, and
public education on environmental issues.
129
125 Verchick, supra note 108, at 38.
126 "The 'second wave' arose from individual activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s
and was eventually embraced by national environmental organizations in a broad
campaign to protect natural resources and the environment. This wave culminated in the
canon of environmental legislation that now regulates much of our nation's air, water,
and waste." Id. (footnotes omitted).
127 Kelman, supra note 109, at 38.
128 PALMER, supra note 106, at 144.
129 Id. at 149.
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Most significantly, however, the second wave culminated in the
rapid adoption of a series of federal statutes designed to reduce toxic
pollutants, protect significant habitats or endangered species, and
addressing other environmental concerns. This series of substantive
pieces of legislation now constitutes the regulatory regime governing
environmental issues in the United States. 1
30
Such legislation includes the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") passed in 1969, the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and RodenticideAct, the Coastal Zone
Management Act and the Ocean Dumping Act (all passed in 1972), the
Endangered Species Act (1973), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), the
Toxic Substances Control Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, both
enacted in 1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA," including 'Superfund')
enacted in 1980.131 After passage of NEPA, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") was established in 1970 with broad powers to create
environmental regulations and enforce environmental laws.' 
32
The achievements of the second-wavists were nothing less than the
establishment of a powerful new, broad, social/cultural norm, reflected in
a set of new federal laws that regulated American private property in ways
never before conceived.
Although the speed with which second wave environmentalism
took root and ripened into a broad enviro-legal framework would seem to
have required a monolithic unanimity and cohesiveness among
environmentalists, the opposite is in fact true. Second wave
environmentalists had differing-indeed, often conflicting-concems,
methodologies, and, particularly, philosophies. These differences, which
130 Verchick, supra note 108, at 27.
131 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-70c (1995)
(passed in 1969); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44 (1995) (passed in
1973); the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-70c(1995) (passed in 1970); the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (1995); the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (1995), the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-64 (1995), the Ocean Dumping Act, 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-45 (1995) (all passed in 1972); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1995) (passed in 1974), the Toxic Substances Control
Act (ToSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-71 (1995), and the Solid Waste Disposal Act (as
amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
6901-92k (1995), were enacted in 1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, including 'Superfund'), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601-75 (1995), was passed in 1980.
132 PALMER, supra note 106, at 149.
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were originally subsumed in the activist euphoria of "taking on the
establishment" and watching themselves do so in the media, became
considerably more pronounced after the rather spectacular achievements
of the second-wavers were secured by the legislation discussed and their
successful influence on the jurisprudence that gave those statutes the force
second wavers had hoped for.'
33
The various environmental groups, as well as scholarly writers.
focusing on environmentalism-lawyers, economists, philosophers,
ecologists, and others in what might be called current "third wave"
environmentalism-reflect the broad United States political spectrum.
Conservatives, Libertarians, Liberals, Socialists, Marxists, and various
other "radicals" are all well represented within the environmental
movement (each group espousing an environmental ethic in keeping with
its own political bent). 134 Even within these separate "camps," there is
intense disagreement. Radical Socialist/Marxists, for example, divide
themselves into separate schools of thought, including "social ecology,"'
135
"deep-ecology,"136 land communty advocacy,137 and "eco-feminsm,"138
133 On the role of citizen activists pressing for federal environmental legislation in the
1960s and 1970s and bringing multiple suits, see generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the
Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of
Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994).
134 For a brief overview of Conservative thought, through the less radical socialist
environmentalist thinking, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Five Paths of Environmental
Scholarship, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 115 (2000).
135 Drawing on Marxist and anarchist works, social ecology, a movement dominated by
Murray Bookchin, argues that mankind's environmental problems are caused primarily
by hierarchical relationships within human society, which result in the oppression of
some members of society by those with the power to control or dominate. Societies
fixated on domination of other human beings are naturally exploiters of nature as well;
therefore, only by changing society's hierarchical norms can one hope to end human
exploitation of nature and address existing environmental problems. For a full exposition
of social environmentalism, see Murray Bookchin, Open Letter to the Ecology
Movement, in TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1980) and other works by the same
author: THE ECOLOGY OF FREEDOM (1982); REMAKING SOCIETY (South End Press 1989);
and THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL ECOLOGY (1990).
136 Although deep ecologists also disagree among themselves, the basic tenets of deep
ecology may be said to be: Self-realization; i.e., each human is not separate. She or he is
interconnected with all other humans and with all parts of nature around them. All parts
of nature including man have an intrinsic and equal value. Self-realization is recognizing
and appreciating this web-like interconnectedness. Deep ecologists also call for
biocentris, radical egalitarianism, new anti-hierarchical socio-economic norms,
reduction of the human population, and human use of nature, including killing living
parts thereof, only to meet basic human needs. For an in-depth discussion of the tenets
briefly outlined here, see Arne Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology
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all of which advocate a non-androcentric environmental ethic; that is, one
that (1) ascribes to nature an intrinsic value of its own, independent of its
value to mankind, (2) views man as part of, rather than "above" or
"different from" nature, and (3) calls for radical societal and institutional
change in order to achieve environmental soundness.
Not all feminists are ecofeminists-those from the liberal tradition
reject it for 4ts "essentialism" aspects (basically: women are natural
nurturers and therefore may be best suited to care for the environment) and
its unwillingness to compromise. Indeed, even among those feminists
who use the label, essentialism is viewed warily.1
39
In addition to political differences, environmentalists in the United
States disagree on the primacy of their interests. Animal rightists, for
example, or those interested in preserving wild areas for hunting and
fishing purposes, may have no interest in, issues of waste disposal or in
developing a morally valid philosophical ethic to govern the relationship
Movement: A Summary, in INQUIRY 16, 95 (1973); BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS,
DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED (1985); ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY,
COMMUNITY AND LIFESTYLE (1989); and WARWICK Fox, TOWARDS A TRANSPERSONAL
ECOLOGY: DEVELOPING NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTALISTS (1990).
137 For an overview of the tenets of this movement, see Freyfogle, supra note 134.
138 Ecofeminists believe that the domination of women and nature are interconnected.
Their fates are interwoven. As feminists, ecofeminists view the oppression of both
women and nature as rooted in one source-patriarchialism. According to ecofeminism:
[T]he connections between the oppression of women and the
oppression of nature ultimately are conceptual: they are embedded in a
patriarchal conceptual framework and reflect a logic of domination
which functions to explain, justify and maintain the subordination of
both women and nature. Ecofeminism, therefore, encourages us to
think ourselves out of "patriarchal conceptual traps," by re-
conceptualizing ourselves and our relation to the non-human natural
world in non-patriarchal ways.
Karen J. Warren, Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 3, 7
(1987). Ms. Warren in footnote 10 of her article borrows the term "conceptual trap" from
Elizabeth Dodson Gray. Ms. Gray describes a conceptual trap as a "set of outmoded
beliefs" and "a way of thinking that is like a room which-once inside-you cannot
imagine a world outside." See also ARIEL SALLEH, ECOFEMINISM AS POLITICS: NATURE,
MARX AND THE POSTMODERN (1997); REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE EMERGENCE OF
ECOFEMINISM (Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990).
139 Ms. Sturgeon writes, "I certainly can attest to numerous occasions when, in
presenting my work in academic feminist contexts, I was assumed to be making
'essentialist' and therefore useless arguments just because I was writing about
'ecofeminism."' NOEL STURGEON, ECOFEMINIST NATURES, RACE, GENDER, FEMINIST
THEORY AND POLITICAL ACTION 168 (1997). She goes on to write of a widespread
assumption, "among my academic peers that such essentialisms permanently and
thoroughly tarnish ecoferninism as a political position." Id.
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between people and nature. Further, modalities differ sharply. There are
writers who are not activists at all and activists who operate within the
existing legal and institutional framework by lobbying or initiating legal
procedures or by conducting legal and peaceful demonstrations and rallies.
And there are activists who believe firmly in civil disobedience and who
act on those principles. 40
Philosophically, some of the more important and interesting legal
issues under debate among various environmentalists include issues such
141
as whether flora and fauna should have "rights" of their own.
Christopher Stone's 1972 Should Trees Have Standing was an influential
work that gained a good deal of attention in environmental ethics
circles.
142
No legal topic appears more compelling, however, than the
arguments among environmentalists over what form or forms our enviro-
legal infrastructure should-take.
As the rising second wave public and political interest in ecology
was translated into legislation, regulation and ensuing judicial
interpretation, it became clear that the rights of property owners had
suffered a considerable turn for the worse from the owners' perspective
because essentially-if we can say that generally speaking, a society's
legal system reflects its basic mores-then the enviro-legal structures
created between 1969-1980 reflected a basic shift in American perceptions
about property ownership rights.
C. Other Philosophical/Ethical Limitations in Lockean Absolutism
In stark contrast to Lockean utilitarian land values are the
"community oriented" land ethics developed by later thinkers such as
Joseph Sax and the "organic" approaches taken by writers such as J. Baird
Callicott, Ernst Schumacher, Albert Schweitzer, Alfred North Whitehead,
and James Lovelock, as well as the Socialist environmental groups
discussed in Section B, supra, and many other writers and thinkers whose
interests focus on environmental ethics.
140 Earth First!, for example, is an organization that advocates civil disobedience and
sabotage in support of its environmentalist concerns, which chiefly focus on the
Vreservation of wilderness from development. PALMER, supra note 106, 
at 147.
41 CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
NATURAL OBJECTS (1972) (updating an earlier 1972 article published in the Southern
California Law Review).
142 PALMER, supra note 106, at 161. See also PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION
(1975).
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These writers and thinkers have; in effect, broken the monopoly of
the L6ckean/Utilitarian tradition in property rights theory and in the
American popular consciousness, helping to broaden the concept of
property rights to add correlative responsibilities to land owners' rights,
making it more amenable to environmentalism. I.
Aldo Leopold's 143 A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and
,There144 was published posthumously in 1948.145: The book is a collection
of essays, beautifully and accessibly written, the most famous of which
was his essay entitled, "The Land Ethic," in which he suggested that
human beings should view themselves not as separate observers of nature,
but rather as "plain members and citizens" I of the entire ecological
community and measure the rightness of human actions affecting the
environment by determining whether such actions would further the
"stability, integrity and beauty of the biotic community.' ' 147 Leopold's
land value not only eliminates Cartesian dualism and intemalism, it also
completely rejects the Lockean/Utilitarian ethic of land-as-commodity. It
places man within the environment, not as its superior entitled to
possessory exploitation, but only as, another part of it. To Leopold, the
message was limpidly clear and beautifully simple: "The land ethic simply
enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants
and animals, or collectively the land.'
14 8
Leopold's new ethic was not only promptly espoused by many
within the environmental movement, it also found its way into American
courtrooms, and with the strong support of legal scholar Joseph Sax, into
the federal regulatory environmental statutes discussed above.
Leopold was cited by Justice Douglas in his dissent in the famous
1972 Sierra Club v. Morton case, in which the Sierra Club as an
association was denied standing to sue the United States Forest Service to
prevent it from selling a wilderness area to Disney for development-but
which opened the door to the notion that an Association could sue as the
representative of individuals who could establish injury to themselves
143 Aldo Leopold (1887-1948) was an American forester educated at Yale's School of
Forestry. He worked for the United States Forestry Service for a twenty-two years before
becoming the University of Wisconsin's Professor of Wildlife Management. See
fenerally PALMER, supra note 106.
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
(1949). .1
145 PALMER, supra note 106, at 33.
146 LEOPOLD, supra note 144, at 201.
147 See generally id.
148 Id. at 204.
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were such development to occur. 149 The case achieved a good deal of
notoriety because Christopher Stone, a law professor, published his
startling proposal about how to decide such standing issues before the
Supreme Court issued its decision. His article argues that legal rights,
such as standing-should be given to objects in, or areas of the
environment, so that they would be considered legal persons, just as are
corporations and ships. The Court did not accept Stone's reasoning, but
Justice Douglas did, in an eloquent and lyrical dissent in which he not only
referenced Stone, but also quoted Leopold.
The Leopoldian ethic clearly trumped Locke's in a regulatory
takings case in California-in fact one might say Locke was literally
thrown out of court! In that case, Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection,'51 the Sierra Club successfully challenged the logging
plans of a lumber company on its lands because the plans, known as
"THPs" or timber harvest plans under California's regulatory system, had
insufficient protection plans for some rare species situated there. Pacific
Lumber cited Locke in support of its position. The Court, however,
brusquely squelched the lumber company: "Locke's 300 year old essay..
has very little to say regarding California's system of THP's."'52 As Zev
Trachtenburg points out:
Leopold's ethical prescription was given legal force in the
well known Wisconsin takings decision Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). In that case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the owners of a
lakeside wetland had no right to alter the natural character
'of their land (by filling it), because "the changing of
wetlands and swamps to the damage of the general public
by upsetting the natural environment and the natural
relationship is not a reasonable use of land," hence could be
legally prevented by regulation.
153
The Utilitarian land ethic has suffered an equally ignominious
defeat at the hands of the Supreme Court. In an important test case for the
Federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), Tennessee Valley Authority v.
149 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
150 STONE, supra note 141.
151 Sierra Club v. Dept. of Forestry and Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 338, 344 n.2. (1993).
152 Id.
153 Trachtenberg, supra note 96, at 88.
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Hill,'54 the TVA had nearly finished construction of the Tellico Dam when
the snail darter, a fish, was added to the endangered list under the ESA.
The snail darter's only habitat in the United States would be destroyed if
the dam were to be opened. But many millions had already been spent on
the new dam. The Supreme Court, holding against the TVA in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, stated that although an argument
could be made that:
In this case the burden on the public though the loss of
millions of unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh
the loss of the snail darter. But neither the Endangered
Species Act, nor article 3 of the Constitution provide
federal courts with the authority to make such fine
utilitarian calculations.' 55
Leopold's ethic also infused Sax's successful efforts to revitalize
the public trust doctrine' 56 in legal scholarship, in the courts, and in
statutory law.
Sax's prolific scholarship on Takings law, which began with his
1964 article, Takings and the Police Power 57 and particularly his Public
Trust theories introduced in 1970,158 is infused with a
Leopoldian/"organic" concept of the man/nature ethic. "It is driven by a
distinctive vision-one in which the earth's resources are becoming
increasingly interconnected and in which there is an increasing need for
the government to resolve conflicts regarding the use of these
resources."' 1
59
His public trust concept received immediate, broad attention and
was widely influential in regulatory takings jurisprudence and on the
154 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 453 U.S. 153 (1978).
155 Id. at 187.
156 "Leopold's vision of land as community has been developed by legal scholar Joseph
Sax to defend the existence of 'public rights' over certain kinds of land use."
Trachtenberg, supra note 96, at 78.
157 Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
158 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
159 Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness of Property, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 327 (1998).
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structure of Several of the federal environmental statutes enacted during
the 1970s and 80s.
160
The public trust doctrine, when imported into American common
law from England, originally applied to navigable waters and shorelines
touched by tides.16 1  Although its origins in American law appear
murky,' 62 Sax traces it back internationally to ancient Roman law.
1 63
According to Sax, the public trust doctrine is rooted in the concept that the
government holds some common property in trust for the public and
therefore has a fiduciary duty to protect such properties for the benefit of
the public.164 Private property owned by individuals has been found
subject to the public trust doctrine so as to prevent the owner from taking
actions thereon deemed injurious to the public.1
65
16o "Sax's idea (the public trust doctrine) caught on quickly influencing the National
Environmental Policy Act, whose history reflects trust considerations at various points..
. as [does] the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act and environmental statutes in
many states. His article is discussed in virtually every environmental law casebook,
hornbook, and law review. article . . ." Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A
Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and
Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1213
(1991); see also Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1540, 1551, 1553 (1985) (including Sax's public trust article among the forty law review
articles most often cited in other law review articles); Thomas A. Campbell, The Public
Trust, What's It Worth?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 73, 86-9 (1994) (discussing
environmental statutes intended to prevent irresponsible private use of resources as
"trustee statutes").
161 Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad. Private
Property Rights, National Sovereignty and the Cost of Environmental Protection, 65 U.
CIN. L. REv. 539 (1997).
162 See, e.g.; Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public
Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 713-15 (1995) (covering several possible
sources of the law doctrine as including common law, state constitutions/statutes, and
federal law arising out of acts which admitted states to the union); but see James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 528-29 (1989) (positing that the doctrine is rooted in
roperty law).
3 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
163-64 (1971).
164 Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 185 (1980).
165 See, e.g., National Audubon Society v. City of Los Angeles, 658 P.2d 709 (1983).
The City, in a proprietary capacity, held property rights in non-navigable tributaries of a
Lake. The Audubon Society sued to prevent Los Angeles from removing water
therefrom as its withdrawals' had effected ecological damage. Using the public trust
doctrine, the Society won, the court holding that protection of the lake's ecosystem was a
public benefit and the City's property rights were limited by the public trust doctrine.
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The geographical scope of the public trust doctrine and the breadth
of the types of public interests, which the courts deem to be protected by
the doctrine, have been growing. Non-navigable waters have been
included 166 as have wetlands. The public uses protected---originally
commercial public uses-have been expanded to include leisure activities
such as swimming and the public interest in the protection of the
environment.167
Joseph Sax has also argued that the public trust doctrine be taken
into consideration in regulatory takings law.' 68 Trachtenberg succinctly
condenses Sax's arguments and proposals as follows:
If the external effects.., of an action taken on one person's
land . . . cause substantial damage to a small number of
others they are like both to recognize and take action
against the responsible owner, say through a suit for
nuisance. But, Sax notes, "one characteristic of external
effects ... is that they often fall quite broadly, affecting a
large number of potential claimants, each in relatively
small amounts." Filling a wetland ... would be such an
action that affects a "diffuse public." But with a diffuse
public it is likely to be impossible, practically speaking, for
all affected parties to unite to initiate a private suit. Say
then the government issues a regulation to protect the ...
diffuse public. This sort of action is now challenged as a
taking, insofar as it limits the right of the landowner to free
use of his... property. But, Sax holds, "to the extent that
the courts adopt this perspective, they deny recognition of
extant public rights. . . ." Thus in Sax's view, rights over
land ought not be vested in landowners as a matter of their
property right; the public's rights deserve equal
consideration . . . in legislative or judicial resolution of
conflicting claims to the common resource base. 169
Sax strongly opposed compensation in regulatory takings cases
where the actions of the landowner, if not regulated, such as wetland
166 Id.; see also Sacco v. Dept. of Public Works, 227 N.E..2d 478 (Mass. 1967).
167 Gardener, supra note 161, at 556.
168 Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 155
(1971).
169 Trachtenberg, supra note 96, at 78-79.
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
filling, would result in damage on other lands, on the basis of the public
trust theory.170  On the other hand, he suggested compensation may be
appropriate where no externalities were involved.171
Sax-like thinking pervades the jurisprudence on regulatory
wetlands takings cases, where in the vast majority of cases, the affected
private property owner--one who is, for example, denied a permit to
develop his land, will lose if he sues for compensation under the federal
Takings clause.
The "organic" group, to give them a somewhat random label, are
neither homogenous as the act of labeling them would seem to imply, nor
as widely accepted as the community-oriented thinkers. Organic thinkers
view the earth and man as one interactive organism, with humans
occupying a role therein no more important than any other element in
nature. These thinkers demand an ecocentric ethic in environmentalism
and many (though far from all) go well beyond community oriented
thinkers in terms of their demands for societal change and reverence for
the environment as essential to ecological success. These groups are
discussed supra. Although they remain at the fringe of awareness in
legislative or judicial thinking, they are very well known and respected
within philosophical scholarship focused on environmental ethics and, to a
lesser, but very significant degree, in academia. As the thinking of these
groups is shared by many environmental associations (otherwise known as
NGOs) their concepts are, therefore, very likely to begin to exert influence
within our societal institutions in the future in the form of tougher
environmental regulation. 1
72
This is not to say that the traditional Lockean notions of property
rights have disappeared from the scene. In fact, the reverse is true. The
"property-rightists," if we may describe those who espouse the libertarian
concept of property rights as such, and the "free-marketers," to borrow a
170 Sax, supra note 168, at 154-55.
171 Id. at 161.
172 TONY EVANS, International Environmental Law and the Challenge of Globalization,
in LAW IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING: NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 224 (Tim Jewell & Jenny Steele eds., 1998) (noting
that despite the good possibility that through these groups' academic and frontline work
inroads will be made in the current political landscape, Evans points out that many NGOs
simply accept the current framework without calling it into question. He states that
"[w]hile many NGOs have been successful at raising public consciousness . . . they
remain committed to the 'common sense', international law approach and therefore
tacitly accept the continuation of current forms of capital expansion and consumerism.
Those that do not [such as ecofeminists] are never invited to participate.").
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term from Freyfogle, 173 remain ardent supporters thereof and both are
engaged in a fierce battle with the more community-minded theorists.1 74
This battle, as will be seen in the discussion on Takings in Section D infra,
is fueled by the certainty of the property rightists, whose land is devalued
by environmental regulations without compensation, that they are bearing
an unfair and unjust portion of the societal cost for environmental
regulation. The compensation issue is further exacerbated by the Supreme
Court's somewhat muddled jurisprudence on Takings, as is also discussed
further below.
For the "free-marketers," "environmental degradation stems
chiefly from deficiencies either in the market or in modem technology...
problems are largely solved but can be solved better, cheaper and with less
government and more freedom than under current laws." '175
The thrust of free-market thinking is primarily anti-government
regulation, and in so far as environmental regulation is a form thereof,
free-marketers engage in great effort to defeat environmentalism when it
interferes with continued resource development by business or efficient
operation of businesses. Examples abound, but two very current battles
are being fought over whether or not oil drilling in the Alaskan National
Refuge should be permitted and whether CO2 should be included on
emission reduction requirement lists.
D. Overview of United States Regulatory Takings Law
Many Americans were unwilling to hand the federal government
any of the monarch-like powers they had just fought a long revolutionary
war over. They were uncomfortable with the proposed federal
Constitution until the Bill of Rights was appended to it. The Fifth
Amendment includes the provision "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."'' 76 It also provides that "no person
• .. shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.",177 The Fourteenth Amendment provides a virtually similar due
process clause applicable to the States 178 and the Supreme Court
173 Freyfogle, supra note 134, at 118.
174 ld.
175Id.
176 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177 Id.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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subsequently applied the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
79
As firmly rooted as Lockean property rights were in the American
consciousness of the time, the Constitution, even as amended by the Bill
of Rights, never prohibited the government from taking a citizens
property-what is prohibited is a taking without "just compensation."
This provision would seem to adequately protect a property owner-if his
land is taken, he will be compensated.
The first question in United States federal regulatory takings cases
is whether there has in fact been a taking.
United Sates case law recognizes, generally, two types of takings.
A physical appropriation of the property or an invasion thereof sufficient
to equate it with a physical appropriation is generally recognized as a
taking for which compensation is due. 180  Into this category fall the
multitude of takings that occur yearly for road and highway construction
and other public uses.
The type of taking more germane to this Note, however, is often
referred to as a "regulatory taking."'18 1 In these situations, an owner of
private property is prohibited, by a governmental regulation, from taking
some action on his property or, in the alternative, he is forced by such a
regulation to take certain actions on his property. These prohibitions--or
requirements-can substantially reduce the degree of control the property
owner has over his own property and can often result in a steep
deterioration of the value of the property and/or severe limitations on the
uses the owner may make of such property.
Takings cases can arise in several ways. Where the government
takes actual possession, in the normal event the acting governmental entity
brings a proceeding to condemn the property and the proper amount of
compensation is determined in the course of that proceeding by the
court. 182 When the property is not taken, but instead the property owner's
rights therein are curtailed in some manner or where, alternatively new
obligations are imposed upon him as owner, the government may not
condemn the property at all. In such situations, the owner may bring an
inverse condemnation proceeding relying on the Fifth Amendment
179 Chi. B. & Q. R. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
180 Susan M. Stedfast, Regulatory Takings: A Historical Overview and Legal Analysis for
Natural Resource Management, 29 ENVTL. L. 881, 884-85 (1999).
181 See generally David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How
Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan and What
State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REv. 523 (1999).
182 Stedfast, supra note 180, at 883.
[Vol.26:891934
"JUST RIGHT" ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME
Takings Clause to demand just compensation. On the other hand, he may
not want compensation. He may instead seek to invalidate the action of
the governmental entity. In such an event he would proceed under either
of the due process clauses.'
83
A brief overview of the United States Supreme Court regulatory
takings cases of the 1970s and 1980s immediately exposes, as will be
seen, a strong bias in favor of the police power and against compensation
to the landowner. These cases increasingly constrain and limit the
landowner's "absolute" rights over his property. Only in the late 1980s,
with the more conservative Supreme Court, did the pendulum begin to
swing toward a new tendency benefiting the landowner at the expense of
governmental regulation.
Despite the similarity of result in the earlier cases, the Court's
jurisprudence over those years is remarkably lacking in clarity for three
main reasons: first, each case is decided on an ad hoc basis-a phrase that
appears in almost every decision; second, new desiderata, i.e., factors to be
considered in deciding such cases; are added in almost every case, and
third, none of these factors are ever actually defined. During this period,
landowners became increasingly frustrated with the end results, while
lower courts and regulators were left with little real guidance. 184
When the pendulum began to swing back toward the landowner,
the lack of clarity remained the only constant. Now, regulators are less
pleased with the end results, but all parties remain uncertain. The
Supreme Court itself has frequently acknowledged the difficulty it has
experienced in achieving takings decisions. 185
183 Id. at 184.
184 Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court
Been Competent in its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, ALI-
ABA Continuing Legal Education Course 130 (Aug. 13, 1998) "The intellectual chaos
that permeates much of what passes for the nation's takings jurisprudence is rooted in the
Court's candidly embraced ad hocery... it creates utter confusion. No one can tell with
any degree of reliability which facts of the controversy will prove to be the operative
ones, and which insignificant.... ." But see Callies, supra note 181, at 526 "[W]hat the
Court has done is clear enough for most purposes. The problem is what the states and
lower federal courts have done with the Court's pronouncements."
185 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (stating
that "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty"); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (in which Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent, "[e]ven
the wisest of lawyers would acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this
Court's takings jurisprudence."); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
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Until 1989, the Supreme Court,; with only one exception in
1922,186 strongly supported the police power, almost invariably deciding
regulatory takings cases in favor of the state or other local authority
imposing the regulation at issue. 
187
That 1922 decision, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, was written by
Justice Holmes. The coal company had reserved the right to mine under
the surface when it sold land to Mahon, who then constructed his home
thereon. Thereafter, Pennsylvania enacted a statute prohibiting coal
mining that would cause the subsidence of human dwellings or other types
of buildings. The coal company objected and lost in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The Holmes decision (Brandeis dissented) reversed the
Pennsylvania decision and found for the coal company on the basis of the
explicit contract reservation, and because, since only residential dwellings
on the property were concerned, the anticipated damage was not "common
or public." As Holmes wrote:
[T]he statute is admitted to destroy previously existing
rights of property and contract. The question is whether the
police power can be stretched so far. Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such
charge in the general law. As long recognized some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses
are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the dimunition. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
the act. So the question depends on the particular facts...
the general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.1
88
In United States Supreme Court cases prior to Pennsylvania Coal,
the Fifth Amendment takings clause was applied to actual physical takings
186 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
187 See generally Robert K. Best, Inverse Condemnation and Related Government
Liability, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Course (Sept. 30, 1999) for a brief
overview of U.S. Takings cases. For a detailed analysis, see Stedfast, supra note 180.
188 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
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of property or such extensive damage to property as to render it totally
unusable, as in the 1872 Pumpelly case, where the government flooded the
plaintiffs property in the course of dam construction. 189 However, use of
the Takings Clause to protest regulatory actions was generally not
successful, because the Supreme Court consistently deferred to the police
power of local government to act in support of a public good.' 90
Accordingly, the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal case was a sharp
departure and a landmark decision. However, in the 50 years thereafter,
there was little further development of landowners' rights in the face of
regulatory takings, and the Supreme Court continued to defer to state
police powers in regulatory takings cases.19
One exception, the 1928 Nectow case, 92 found overreaching in
the city's new zoning plan that had restricted the property owner's
business use by including the property within the edges of a more
residential district, thereby significantly reducing the property's value.
The owner proceeded under the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. The Supreme Court noted that the property could just as easily
have been put in the business zone, as it was virtually surrounded by that
zone and held that the zoning authorities action "comes within the ban of
the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be sustained."' 93 The Court stated
that:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations
with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the
character of his use, is not unlimited, and, other questions
aside, such restrictions cannot be imposed if it does not
bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.1
94
189 Pumpelly v. Greenbay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
190 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (city proscribed brewery operation);
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S 171 (1915) (city prohibited livery stable business);
Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (city boundaries expanded to encompass
claimant's land and city regulations prohibited brick yards within city).
191 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (holding property owner was
required to destroy his ornamental cedar trees to protect some apple orchards lying within
a certain radius); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning
change reduced value of property owner's land from $10,000 an acre to $2,500 an acre).
192 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
193 Id. at 189.
194 Id. at 188.
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Although the Supreme Court would continue to view physical
invasions by the government as a taking,' 95 with the exception of Nectow,
the Court still deferred to the state's police power. However, regulatory
jurisprudence continued to develop even as property owners lost their
cases. In the 1962 Goldblatt case, 196 a property owner who excavated
sand and gravel below the water table was prohibited from doing so by a
new town regulation prohibiting such activity at such levels. The purpose
of the ordinance was to protect against flooding. The property owner lost
and the court found no taking. While the opinion did reemphasize that
police powers were not unlimited and a regulation could be so deleterious
as to render it unconstitutional, the Court noted that there was "no set
formula"'197 to distinguish valid regulations from unconstitutional takings,
but stated that "comparison of values before and after is relevant" and
added that such comparison is "by no means conclusive."' 198 The term "no
set formula" became a basic ingredient in Supreme Court Takings
decisions, thereby generating an uncertainty and vagueness frustrating to
both landowners and regulators.
In the 1978 Penn Central'99 case the railroad wished to build a
tower over its terminal building, but was blocked by the City Landmark
Commission, which refused approval. The railroad lost, but several new
elements of takings desiderata were added to existing precedent. Each
case, the Court noted, necessitated an ad hoc analysis and "no set formula"
could be applied. 20 0  The Court, however, identified three factors that
"have particular significance;" 20 1 "the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations" ("IBE"),2 °2 and the character of
the action by the government (physical invasion vs. regulatory
limitations).20 3
The Penn Central case emphasized a requirement that the property
as a whole be considered in takings analysis and not by separate segments
195 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. County of Alleghany, 369
U.S. 84 (1962) (both involving "invasion" by overflights of airplanes).
196 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
197 Id. at 593.
198 Id. at 594.
199Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
200 Id. at 124.
201 Id
202 Id.
203 Id.
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of it. Thus, the court examined air rights and the terminal together,
refusing to consider the effect of the air rights alone. It also found that the
ability to use the terminal as the railroad had previously done, and the fact
that it could, possibly, obtain approval from the Commission to sell the air
rights-meant that the regulation complained of did allow "reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site" 2° and did promote a valid public
good.
While this three-prong test-the economic impact, the effect on
investment-backed expectations, and the nature of the government
action-appears clear on its face, Justice Brennan's opinion in the case did
not define "investment-backed expectations" and the new emphasis on the
"whole property" as the denominator in the determination of the economic
benefit to the landowner added another element of uncertainty both in this
opinion and subsequent decisions. Although he cites Holmes' 1922
decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon as the source for application of
the IBE test (although the term was not used in Pennsylvania Central
case), Brennan also cites, in a footnote, an article by Professor Frank I.
Michelman written in 1967 in which Michelman used the term "some
distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed
expectation ' 2°5 in analyzing the impact of a less than complete taking.
Brennan's opinion narrows IBE arguments by an application of a
"whole property" rule, and further by its statement that an owner's
subjective intent to do a particular thing with property-as, say, build a
tower in the air above-is not a determinative factor in establishing an
IBE. He notes that "the submission that [Penn Central] may establish a
'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to
exploit a property interest they heretofore had believed was available for
development is quite simply untenable." 20 6 This "exploitation language"
appears to narrow IBE considerations to exclude secondary or non-
historical uses because Brennan also based his decision on the fact that the
statute complained of did not affect the railroad's "primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel, 20 7 that is, its operation as a rail terminal.
Perhaps most important, the dissent in Penn Central (by then
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens)
acknowledged that a taking by regulation could occur and opined further
that the preservation ordinance had gone too far and should be struck
204 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 483 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
205 Id. at 138 n.4.
206 Id. at 130.
207 Id. at 136.
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down. The dissent's willingness in this respect indicated the potential of a
future break from the prevailing deference to the police power. This
indeed came to pass in subsequent Supreme Court cases, as will be seen.
Later, United States Supreme Court cases have provided little
clarity respecting IBEs and a clear definition remains elusive, although
these cases have added even more additional elements to takings analysis,
some of which relate to IBEs, and some of which do not, but all of which
appear to be "tacked on" to the Brennan "three prong test.,
20 8
In Andrus v. Allard, for example, decided a year after Penn
Central, Allard, an artifacts dealer, was prosecuted for violation of several
bird protection statutes because he bought and then resold artifacts that
contained proscribed bird feathers. The artifacts had been made prior to
the passage of the statutes. They were not taken from his possession, but
he was prohibited from selling them, thus their economic value to him was
lost, as was his IBE of profitable resale. The Court cited Penn Central for
the "whole property" rule and held that only one stick of Allard's "bundle
of rights" had been affected-the right to sell-and pointed out that he
still had other rights--e.g., to possess, devise, exhibit, or donate them. In
addressing the reduction in economic value aspect of Penn Central's
three-prong "test," the Court acknowledged that the statute did annihilate
the most valuable use-resale-but said this was not a decisive factor.
The Court wrote, "[a] reduction in the value of property is not necessarily
equated with a taking."20 9 One could easily agree with the previous
sentence based on precedent. However, Allard's "primary expectation"
was resale-yet Brennan had based his Penn Central decision at least
partially on the fact that the railroad's "primary expectation" had not been
affected. The two cases thus achieved the same result, but at the cost of
clarity.
Further, the Court said that loss of anticipated profits-absent a
physical taking-is very unlikely to serve as a basis for takings claim.
"Loss of future profits-unaccompanied by any physical restriction-
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." 21°  One
wonders then, what the point of introducing IBEs in Penn Central had
been-for certainly IBEs are "future profits." Further, the Court noted
that "prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned
speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform." 211 This
208 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
209 Id. at 66.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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holding would appear to further narrow IBEs to exclude even anticipated
profits from a "primary" use-which, in the case of a dealer like Allard-
would be nothing other than resale. Thus it would seem that a primary
use, such as the terminal operation in Penn Central, which has an
historical record of X profit at Y% annual increase might be protected by
takings law, but a "speculative" non-historical expectation will not be.
In the same year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.212 the Court
found for a developer that had built a channel from its pond to the bay,
after being assured by the Army Corps of Engineers that no permit was
required. After the channel was built, the Corps told Kaiser Aetna that the
pond was now, due to the channel connection, navigable water and that
therefore Kaiser Aetna was required to allow the public access to the
pond. The Court reiterated the "no set formula" and "ad hoc analysis"
pronouncements of Penn Central and said it would consider "the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action"213 -a three prong test very similar to Penn Central's wording.
The Court found that the Corps' failure to require permits did not estop the
Corps, but that it did create expectations in Kaiser.214 It also found that
the Corps' demand for public access denied Kaiser an important
ownership element-the right to exclude others from the property. This
right to exclude, the Court said, was "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property; '215 one
"universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right. 216
Thus, it would seem, the "whole property" theory of Penn Central and
Andrews will be disregarded if the "stick" taken is the "right to exclude."
However, in the 1980 Pruneyard case, that did not hold true; although it
did in the 1982 Loretto case. 2 17  Another "stick" within the property
212 Kaiser Aetna v. United States., 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
213 Id. at 174-75.
214Id. at 167.
215 Id. at 176.
216Id. at 179-80.
217 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 274 (1980) (Shopping center
property owner not permitted to exclude pamphleteers from entering its grounds and
soliciting petition signatures because of a California Constitution provision guaranteeing
the right to petition). The Court applied the Penn Central three-prong test but found little
real economic impact on the centers owners and held the petitioners presence did not
unreasonably affect the owners IBEs; but see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (apartment house owner required to allow cable TV company
to install cable equipment on the building) in which the Court applied Penn Central's
three-prong test as well to a taking that had little economic impact, but nevertheless
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bundle subsequently deemed so essential as to derail the "whole property"
concept is the right to devise.
218
Further guidelines appeared in Agins v. City of Tiburon, a 1980
Supreme Court zoning restriction case, which the city won.219 Agins had
acquired property to develop and subsequently the city rezoned it so as to
permit no more than one to five houses on the property, thus dealing the
developer a very significant economic blow. The Court held that a land
use regulation does not become a taking so long as it "substantially
advances legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land., 220 This two-prong test for zoning
ordinances is, obviously, different from the three-prong test in Penn
Central, and merely adds to the confusion and uncertainty of Takings
jurisprudence.
In 1984, IBEs in land use cases were further limited by the so
called "notice" rule applied in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.221 There, a
federal environmental statute resulted in an alleged taking of Monsanto's
trade secrets respecting its pesticides, but Monsanto's awareness of the
passage of the statute was held to have put it on notice and rendered its
JiBEs in the pertinent trade secrets unreasonable. 22
The constructive notice rule has been followed to deny takings in
federal lower courts since Monsanto223 and promises to play a major role
in the Rhode Island wetlands case in which property owner Anthony
Palazzolo, with the financial and legal support of the conservative Pacific
224Legal Foundation, has appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
As of this writing that case is due to be decided shortly.
It is also important to note the Monsanto case is not a land use case
and that Monsanto's ability to protect its rights therein was a benefit to
found a taking. In Loretto, the Court emphasized the third prong-the nature of the
government regulation-and found that where the regulation involves a permanent and
p hysical intrusion a taking will be deemed to have occurred.
iS See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234
S1997).19 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
220 Id. at 260.
221 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Sucesion Suarez v. Gelabert, 541 F. Supp.
1253 (D.P.R. 1982), aff'd., 701 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1983).
224 Cary Goldberg, Test Case on Property Rights Challenges Wetland Curbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at A12.
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Monsanto and one it "voluntarily" sought, and, in fact, these distinctions
were pointed out in the Nollan case.225
Three 1987 cases added new tools for analysis, but still provided
no clear definitions for guidance to those concerned. In Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus,2 26 despite a set of facts
very similar to those of the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal Case, the coal
company, property owner of the right to subsurface mining, was found not
to have been subjected to a taking. A Pennsylvania statute prohibited
subsurface mining due to the danger of subsidence under certain types of
buildings. The Keystone court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal on
essentially the character of the regulation; holding that the regulation in
the earlier case was more focused on protecting private interests of
individual homeowners while the Keystone regulation was aimed at
protecting "the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal
integrity of the area., 227 The court viewed the police power here as having
been necessitated in order to abate a public nuisance.22 8
The court also, applying the "whole property" analysis, found that
the regulation met the second prong of the Agins test in that it did not
"den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land., 229 The "whole
property" incorporated into the Court's analysis was all of the coal in the
state, most of which the coal companies could continue to mine, and thus
the 27 million tons rendered inaccessible by the statute were merely one
stick in the bundle.2 3 0 Thus, as it had done in Penn Central, the Court
selected an extremely broad denominator in determining whether there
was sufficient damage to justify compensation.
The Court in discussing "economically viable use" made specific
note that property owners claiming regulatory takings have the "heavy
burden" to show sufficient property value loss to establish a taking.23' But
what is "sufficient" has never been defined, and that is a very key question
for both landowners and regulators.
Two other cases in the same year offered property owners a bit
more optimism due to the new restraints they imposed on governmental
regulation.
210 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
226 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
227 Id. at 488.
228 Id. at 480.
229 Id. at 485 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
230 Id. at 498.
231 Id. at 493.
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In First English,232 a church was temporarily prevented by Flood
plain regulation, from re-building its buildings in a flood area. Noting that
its dictum would apply only where "all use of property" 233 was denied, the
Court held that compensation was required for temporary takings. It also
noted that it was aware that its holding "undoubtedly lessen[s] to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land use regulations.,
234
The Nollan235 case further restricted land use planners. The
Nollans, in order to build their home on beachfront property, were
required to obtain a permit from the Coastal Commission and did so.
However, the permit was conditioned upon the Nollan's granting of an
easement over their property to the public to enable the public to "pass
across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line on
one side, and their seawall on the other side."236 The Nollans argued that
the easement requirement was a taking. The Supreme Court agreed. The
opinion, by Justice Scalia, this time focused on the first prong of the A gins• " ... t ,237
test, i.e., whether it "substantially advanced legitimate state interests.
Scalia found the state interest to be legitimate, but found no "essential
nexus" between those interests and the permit requirement.
238
Acknowledging that it had not theretofore established any standards
respecting how to meet this "essential nexus" requirement 239 and further
stating that it did not intend to do it this decision, the Court simply said
that it could not, on these facts, see any nexus standard at all that would be
240reasonable.
Even more interesting, the Nollan decision appears to substantially
weaken the Monsanto "constructive notice" limitation on IBEs of property
owners. The Nollans, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, were
on notice and should therefore have had no reasonable IBEs respecting an
easement-free beachfront for themselves. They had notice because,
Brennan argued, "stringent regulation of development along California the
232 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304
1987).
33 Id. at 321.
234 Id.
235 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987).
236 Id. at 828.
237 Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
238 Id. at 837.
239 Id. at 837.
240 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 858-59.
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coast' 241 had been in place for many years, and that a condition requiring
access had been placed on all other development proposals in their tract.
Scalia's opinion disagreed, and distinguished Monsanto on the voluntary
basis of the exchange between Monsanto's registration and the consequent
loss of trade secrets. The right to improve property is not bestowed by the
government as a benefit, as in the product protection afforded by the
opportunity to register one's product with the government, thus the
requirement for an easement as a condition of permit issuance does not
involve the property owner in a "voluntary" exchange. These comments of
Scalia's are contained in a footnote, 242 which does not address IBEs per se.
However, it would seem to imply that a taking can occur if the owner is
prevented from building on his land even if the landowner purchased the
land with some degree of awareness of pre-existing land use restrictions.
The 1992 Lucas decision,243 indicated even more clearly that the
Court was swinging further away from the protection of police powers
towards tighter protection of property owner's rights. The property owner
purchased waterfront lots intending* to build homes on them.
Subsequently, a statute was enacted prohibiting any building whatsoever
on the property. The lot owner alleged a taking and the Supreme Court
agreed. After a review of takings law in which the Court reaffirmed the
principles developed in previous cases, including the need to review each
case on an ad hoc basis, Scalia's opinion concluded that there are at least
"two discrete categories" of regulatory effects on property owners that will
be deemed takings "without case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint." 244 The first is a physical invasion
("at least with regard to permanent invasions") 245 and the other is a
regulatory effect that eliminates "all economically beneficial or productive
use of land.,
246
The Scalia opinion, in establishing an entirely new rule-that a
loss of "all economic beneficial or productive use of land" would work as
a compensable taking, also deeply wounded well settled nuisance theory
regarding police powers upon which the South Carolina Supreme Court
had relied in finding for the Coastal Commission; i.e., that a taking that
prevented nuisance did not require compensation even if all economic
241 Id. at 843.
2 4 2 ld. at 833 n.2.
243 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
244 Id. at 1015.
245 Id.
246 Id.
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value was lost. Scalia wrote that while its previous decisions "suggested
that 'harmful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by
government regulation without the requirement of compensation" 247 it
now viewed that theory as too subjective (this from a blithely ad hocean
bench!) because whether the alleged taking was one to prevent a harm to
the public, or alternatively, to confer a benefit thereunto lies mainly in the
eye of the particular beholder; i.e., it depends largely on the decider's
views. Scalia then simply subsumed the nuisance theory into the Agins
"substantial advancement of legitimate state interests" test, opining that
the nuisance theory was merely an earlier formulation on the way to the
development of the Agins test.
Why "legitimate state interests" should be any less subjective then
"noxious-use" was not addressed. Nor was any attempt made to address
what would have been the result if less than all-economic value had been
taken. In Lucas, the parties had both acknowledged the remainder value
was zero.
The Court "cut out" one new exception to replace the "old"
nuisance theory exception. It remanded the ease to South Carolina, stating
that a state could avoid compensation only when it could show that "the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. 248 Lucas,
then, would not have the right to fill his wetland and build upon it if his
title could be shown never to have included that right anyway. To
determine this, Scalia wrote, one would need to examine a) his title and b)
the "background principles" of property and nuisance law in South
Carolina.2
49
Although the public trust theory is a background principle of
property law in America particularly as to wetlands 25° the South Carolina
court, on remand, looked only at nuisance and found nothing therein that
would have blocked Lucas's development rights; accordingly the state
purchased the property from Lucas.25'
The Court did not, however, "analyze possible public trust rights in
the beach front property ' 252 Why is unclear, however, the use of the public
247 Id. at 1022.
248 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
249 Id. at 1029.
250 See generally Casperson, supra note 118.
251 Id. at 373.
252 Id.
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trust doctrine in this kind of a-takings analysis is certainly not precluded
by Lucas-as many legal scholars have pointed out.
253
The 1994 Dolan case 254 provides no further illumination on the
Holmes 1922 question; i.e., when does a regulation go "too far?" Dolan
wished to pave a parking lot for her store and enlarge the store, but when
she applied for a permit the City imposed conditions thereon requiring her
to dedicate two parcels to the City; i.e., that part that was in the floodplain
of a nearby Creek and another 15' strip to be used as a bicycle path. As in
Nollan, the Dolan court focused on the "state interest" prong of the Agins
test, and citing Nollan, reiterated the need for an "essential nexus" and
found same, but now added a new element for consideration in takings
analysis; iLe., "rough proportionality ''255, or reasonableness of the
connection between the imposed requirement (the dedications) and the
impact of the action the property owner wished to take.256
This new standard was found not to have been met by the City;
thus, Dolan won. The Court said that the City had not shown why Dolan
had to dedicate the flood-plain strip-as opposed to just leaving it
undeveloped. The dedication requirement meant she would lose the
ability to exclude others from her property (one of the essential sticks the
Supreme Court sometimes focuses on). As for the bikeway, the City had
not quantified the additional traffic expected due to Dolan's enlargement
and parking availability. -
In the 1999 Monteray case257 the landowner again prevailed, but
two interesting results emerged from the Supreme Court decision. First,
the Court expressly stated that the Dolan "rough proportionality" rule is
limited. "[w]e have not extended the rough proportionality test of Dolan
beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning
approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.
253 See, e.g., Casperson, supra note 250; see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY (1992) (positing that
Scalia's opinion encourages use of the public trust doctrine in takings analysis); James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (acknowledging, while criticizing the public trust doctrine itself,
that the doctrine defeats a takings claim).
254 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
255 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987).
256,"No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that tie required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
257 City of Monteray v. Del Monte Dunes at Monteray, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
258 Id. at 702.
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On the other hand, in the courts below, the question of the reasonableness
of the City's land use decision was allowed to go to a jury and that action
had been upheld in the state's Supreme Court-the United States Supreme
Court affirmed that decision, stating that the reasonableness of the City's
regulations were not left up to the jury, and that the jury was only
requested to decide whether "legitimate public interests" were
substantially advanced.259
Lastly, and most startling, the Supreme Court also found that the
landowner's takings claim was proper to submit to a jury, at least on the
issue of whether or not any economically viable use remained, that being,
the Court said, an essentially fact-laden issue. It did narrow its ruling to
apply only to those cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964260 (as
was this one). Despite this narrowing, the decision appears to throw into
regulatory takings claims the added uncertainties inherent in jury
decisions-a factor that seems to ensure a chilling effect on regulators.
Perhaps the most radical new changes the Supreme Court has
added to Takings jurisprudence to date are those reflected in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel. 261 In that case, the Supreme Court found the 1992
Federal Coal Act 62 unconstitutional. The Coal Act provisions applicable
in this case required any existing or former coal company to pay for health
care coverage for miners and their dependents. The Social Security
Administration was given the duty to allocate these costs among the coal
companies. Eastern objected to its allocation (which exceeded $5 million
for a 12 month period) and claimed that the assessment was
unconstitutional. A plurality of four justices (Rehnquist, Scalia,
O'Connor, and Thomas) held the assessment unconstitutional under the
Takings Clause. Thomas also argued it might violate the Ex Post Facto
clause. Kennedy rejected all the above, but joined the first four agreeing it
was unconstitutional-for Kennedy it violated Due Process. The
remaining Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens felt no takings
clause issue presented here, but subjected the matter to a due process
analysis, opining in their dissent that the Coal Act did not violate Due
Process. 263 The breadth of the Court's wording in its decision is bound to
open up vast new opportunities for litigation of partial takings. The Court
259 Id. at 706.
260 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
261 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
262 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994 ed. &
Supp. II).
263Id. at 553. (This Note confines this discussion to the Takings Clause only).
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found a taking can occur whenever a "severe, disproportionate, and
extremely retroactive burden on Eastern. ' '2 64 This is indeed a radical new
doctrine. Where the Court goes from there seems even less predictable
than before.
265
The uncertainties in Takings jurisprudence, and the bias against
compensation that prevailed until recently at the Supreme Court level,
have led to a severe backlash against environmentalism in the United
States, in which property rightists, or the "wise use" movement
members,266 and the Republican Party have taken aim at environmentalism
by attempting to pass legislation that would restrict either the amount of
property that can be taken before compensation is paid and/or the budgets
of environmental agencies.
267
In addition to such attempts at legislation, property rightists have
brought suit after suit on regulatory takings in federal and state courts.
268
Further, the level of vitriol between the warring camps of
environmentalism and property rightists appears to be increasing
264 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498, at 538.
265 Of course, the case is capable of being distinguished from future cases on several
grounds, but the breadth of its holding does appear to be a significant warning to
regulators.
266 "Although proponents of wise use do not have a common leader or agenda, they are
united by their shared resentment of government regulation of privately held property."
William L. Inden, Compensation Legislation: Private Property Rights vs. Public
Benefits, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 120 (1996). For general background on the
Wise Use movement, see Richard Miniter, You Just Can't Take It Anymore: America's
Property Rights Revolt, 123 POL'Y REv. 40, 40 (Fall 1994) (describing goals of this
movement and estimating that there are "more than 500 active property rights groups
across the country, with a total of some two million members.").
267 See, e.g., The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, part of the Republican
party's 1994 "Contract with America," which would have shifted much of the costs of
environmental regulation from businesses, states and local governments to the EPA and
other federal agencies. Section 8 available at http:www.geocities.com/way2muchsense/
prior issues/contract.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002); Frank Clifford, Bill Would Limit
Federal Power Over Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at Al. See also Jonathan
E. Rinde, Take Me, Take Me: Can There be a Private Property Rights Bill that
Environmentalists Support, PA. L. WKLY., Aug. 14, 1995, at 56 (discussing several
property rightist bills proposed in 1995); David Coursen, Property Rights Legislation: A
Survey of Federal and State Assessment and Compensation Measures, 26 ENVTL. L. REP.
10, 239 (1996); Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for Environmental
Purposes. The Takings Implications of Government-Authorized Aerial Pesticide
Spraying, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65 (1999); Robert-Meltz, Wetlands Regulation and the
Law of Regulatory Takings, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10468 (2000) (discussing Congressional
efforts to amend sections of the Clean Air Act over the years).
268 See generally Gardner, supra note 267; Inden, supra note 266.
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steadily.269 Suggestions as to how this kind of dilemma might be avoided
on the international scene-and perhaps here at home too-will be
discussed in Section III.
United States regulatory Takings jurisprudence did have the effect
of curtailing the absolutism of property rights often attributed to Lockean
theory-a benefit for the advancement of environmental programs in the
United States. On the other hand, the lack of clarity left a bad taste in the
mouths of both camps and led to unnecessary enmity-a distinct
disadvantage to environmentalism.
III. TOOLS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOVEREIGNTY AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Success on the international front necessitates reliance on
sovereignty as that concept has evolved, as discussed in Section I.
Thinkers and environmentalists have expressed great concern
about sovereignty and its seeming obdurance in the face of the
increasingly rapid deterioration of the earth's environment.270 Some are
concerned that sovereignty's inaction in the face of quickly spiraling
damage-or its leaden pace in attempting to deal with same-may be
simply an indication that sovereignty is inherently unable to cope with the
problems of earth's interconnected environment.27' Despite these
269 See, e.g., Michael Grove, The Importance of Property Rights.: Capitalism Is the
Process of Creative Devotion, in 59 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 569, 571 (1993)
(stating that environmental bureaucrats are worthless parasites); see also Casperson,
supra note 118, at 357 (giving us a good example of the divide between the camps by
discussing the debate, when the gray wolf was re-introduced into Yellowstone, between
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Idaho's Republican Representative, Helen
Chenoweth. "Babbitt hailed the reintroduction as 'an important and historic chapter in
American history."' Chenoweth, in stark contrast, viewed the wolves as "trespassers
onto the lands of Idaho and Babbitt himself as a "trespasser onto the Constitution of the
United States.").
270 Many environmentalists advocate the need to end sovereignty entirely before
international environmentalism can succeed. See, e.g., the "social" environmental
movements supra footnotes 116 and 117.
271 One example that gives rise to such pessimism is the Kyoto Protocol. Twenty-two
years in the making, the second (which would bind developed nations, with exceptions
for China and India, to cut emissions of gases which produce global warming by 5.2 %
by 2012 from 1990 levels) was finally reached in 1997. Signed by 100 nations, it remains
un-ratified and the Bush Administration has recently made clear that the United States,
the world's greatest producer of such emissions, will not support the agreement. See,
e.g., Douglas Jehl, U.S. Going Empty-Handed to Meeting on Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, March 29, 2001, at Al.
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concerns, the simple fact is that there is no other choice available for the
development of international agreements. Sovereignty is not only a fact
of life and unlikely to disappear in the near future, but it can also be a
valuable tool for international environmentalism. As we have seen,
sovereignty, in the process of redefining itself, has made itself into what
can and should be environmentalism's valued ally.
Sovereignty, as now defined, also appears to be the "just right"
candidate for a global environmental regime in terms of implementation.
This is because the state sovereign is now "weak" enough (read aware of
its responsibilities to the world at large) to see itself as part of a global
community; yet the state is "strong" enough (read willing and able to act)
to be able to implement such a global environmental regime. To put it in
fairy tale terms-Sovereignty is not too strong and it is not too weak: for
the required role in international environmentalism it is "just right."
Further, the state also seems the perfect and appropriately sized,
vehicle to serve as enforcer. A larger body, such as the United Nations or
the European Union 272 may be too large and localities too small. A look at
the concept of urban sprawl provides a good example of why the state
seems "just right" in this capacity as well--can one imagine urban sprawl
being managed from the international level? What does a diplomat from
France know about the problems associated with sprawl affecting people
living in Richmond, Virginia? Not very much. Very beneficial decision
making can be achieved at the international level-with very efficient
outcomes because of the input of experts and the ability to hear multiple
solutions, but can the United Nations or some other similar body, keep on
eye on Fairfax County, Virginia? The answer is no.
On the other hand, if sprawl is addressed only at the local level, for
example, by Fairfax and other counties, it produces countywide infighting
as counties, motivated by self-interest, wrestle with one another to secure
larger portions of the finite tax base pie. Such inconsistency at the local
level provides only miniscule per county gains. In the end, there is still a
Wal-Mart every five miles and incoherence in planning is the norm. The
United Nations is too big, the locality is too small, but the state/federal
level of administration is, probably just right.
If utilized in such a fashion for implementation, states will feel as
if they are invested in the process. Instead of being dictated to by an
272 This is not to denigrate the United Nations or the European Union. The United
Nations has contributed extensively to international developments and in many ways the
European Union is light years ahead of the United States in addressing environmental
problems. See generally LAW IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING: NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Tim Jewell & Jenny Steele eds., 1998).
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international body, state representatives could help. formulate the
environmental regimes and play a significant role in their implementation.
Individual states have the best chance of effectively implementing such
legislation and if states are allowed, as the federalist system allows in' the
United States, to put a local flavor on overarching decisions, it may make,
these decisions more palatable to locals. By providing effective
implementation measures at a level that would prevent local infighting,
state sovereignty becomes not a stumbling block to global
environmentalism, but rather is an integral partner within it., Sovereignty's
strengths are harnessed for a greater good.
As we have seen with sovereignty, private property rights also
have undergone a process of re-conceptualization, moving from absolutist
Lockean interpretations to incorporate restraints and responsibilities, such
as the public trust doctrine and nuisance prohibitions as supported by
Takings jurisprudence in the United States. As now construed, private
property is proving itself as a valid partner for environmentalism.
Even though the property rights backlash discussed supra would
have environmentalism and private property at war, the fact is that both
are better served with the other in place.
And, as with sovereignty, private property rights are a fact of life
and one that environmentalism should accept on that ground alone.
Further, private property can partner very well with environmentalism to
produce acceptable international solutions.274 As Thomas Merrill points
out so well, private property is not "about to wither away, like the
bourgeois state after the proletarian revolution... private property clearly
is ascendant around the world.. .the business corporation owned by
273 It should be noted that states are more than willing to relinquish control when global
trade is the issue, allowing the WTO, NAFTA, and GATT to be implemented at the
expense of sovereign rights. However, this global trade model can provide enlightenment
for reluctant states-they are more then willing to accept reduced sovereignty in return
for trade dollars, so why not accept it in return for global well-being-in that it can be
used to point out that most states already participate in a global trade regime.that was
agreed to at the international level and implemented locally, so why not participate in an
environmental global regime. As Prue Taylor writes, "states have seemingly surrendered
substantial portions of their sovereignty over regulation of trade, the environment, and
national economic development, in the interests of global free trade." TAYLOR, supra
note 45, at 118.
274 There are some compelling arguments offered by private property rights advocates
that strong private property rights are the answer to environmental problems. See
generally WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
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shareholders as a form of private property, dominates other modes for
organizing... labor.,
275
.. Merrill goes on to illustrate that widespread privatization and de-
regulation is going on in both socialist and capitalist countries-and that,
within environmentalism itself, many programs and proposals borrow
ideas from private property, not all of which are "market mimicking
mechanisms," as Merrill describes them.276 That public regulation often
incorporates these ideas in aid of environmentalism is indicative of some
of the possibilities for partnership between private property and the
environment.
277
The environment versus trade/development issues arising under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and its successor, the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") and under the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") provide one good backdrop against which
to examine appropriate international Takings jurisprudence as one piece-
but an important piece--of an international environmental regulatory
regime that is broadly accepted, both among the sovereign states and
among both property rightists and free-marketers on the one hand and
environmentalists on the other.
278
275 Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness of Property, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 327, 343 (1998).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 343-44. It is important to note that many "free-marketers" advocate that all
environmental problems be left to the market for the best and most efficient solutions and
that no regulation per se. is therefore necessary or appropriate, see, e.g., TERRY L.
ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). The branch
of law known as "Law and Economics" (whose advocates include several prominent
judges such as Richard Posner and indeed, entire law schools, for example, the University
of Chicago) embraces this type of philosophy. The problem with Law and Economics is
that it has difficulty including "irrational" formulations into its "rational" underlying
calculations usually based on cost-benefit analysis. How, for example, does one place a
value on the inherent beauty of an unspoiled woodland? It is much easier to calculate the
value of the woodland in terms of its benefits to man-the value of the wood, the value of
the property, the potential value of the untapped natural resources beneath the land, the
jobs generated in these endeavors, etc. How can simple beauty win when competing with
concrete monetary values and job growth? For a critique of Law and Economics from
the feminist perspective, decrying its reliance on cost/benefit analysis in the
environmental arena and its to the total exclusion of inherent benefits, see Dowling,
supra note 100; see also Freyfogle, supra note 134 (Freyfogle questions Law and
Economics: "It is not enough, for instance to put neoclassical economic models to use as
if they were value free or enjoyed unquestioned scholarly acceptance.").
278 A detailed discussion of all three, GATT, the WTO, and NAFTA, is beyond the scope
of this Note. Untold numbers of articles have been written on aspects of each. See
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In aid of the usefulness to each other of private property and
environmentalism, it is essential that Takings jurisprudence in
International Law neither create the uncertainties and lack of clarity found
in United States Takings law, as discussed in Section II, nor take the kind
of doctrinaire anti-compensation approach that has led to such frustration
and angry backlash against environmental regulation in the United States,
also discussed in Section II. Certainly, in the development of an
acceptable international environmental regime, the issue of "takings" of
various forms, whether so-called or not, will need to be dealt with. The
North/South2 79 divide makes that inevitable and is a question the
resolution of which lies at the heart of a successful international regime.
For some years, the United States has used trade embargoes or
threats thereof as part of its international marine conservation policies.
Through such threats, the United States attempts to bring the offending
sovereign in line with United States thinking on proper conservation
norms. Examples include the use of such threats to reduce the number of
whales taken; 2 8 prevent tuna fisherman from killing dolphin as they
spread and haul in tuna nets281; and avoid the drowning of sea turtles in
shrimp fishing.282 These United States threats have been the subject of
proceedings brought against the United States under the WTO dispute
resolution procedures.
With respect to NAFTA, corporations domiciled in one country but
doing business within the territory of a second sovereign country have
proceeded against that second sovereign when that country imposed or
attempted to enforce one of its own internal environment regulations
against the corporation, using the NAFTA dispute resolution proceedings.
generally Jeffery Atik, Uncorking International Trade, Filling the Cup of International
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1231 (2000).
279 "North/South" is used to refer to the Developed/Developing countries split. A major
impediment to a global environmental regime is the chasm of differences between these
two camps.
280 See, e.g., Gene S. Martin, Jr. & James W. Brennan, Enforcing the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pell and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments, 17 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 293, 294-97 (1989).
281 See, e.g., Joseph J. Urges, Dolphin Protection and the Mammal Protection Act Have
Met Their Match: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 31 AKRON L. REV. 457,
459-60 (1998).
282 For the WTO ruling against the United States in the shrimp-turtles case, see Appellate
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999). For background and a good discussion of the case,
see Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles: The International and Domestic
Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y 345
(1999).
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These disputes reveal several important lacks that seem to present
glaring obstacles to the development of just and equitable international
environmental regulatory takings jurisprudence. The first and perhaps
most obvious gap is the absence of a starting point or threshold. Although
.the Fifth Amendment Takings clause is a broad statement of principal, and
open to a variety of interpretations, it, together. with developed nuisance
law, takings jurisprudence and existing regulation constitutes a very rich
and flexible beginning point for domestic dispute resolution. It is not
perfect, but it is there, and it has the strength of credibility and precedent
behind it.
There is no comparable accepted base point or framework from
which to begin all takings analysis in international law. Perhaps because
the various bases upon which any such analysis would rely come from a
multitude of sources 283 within international law, and/or perhaps because
such a framework would be difficult to construct, given the sovereign
states' disparate viewpoints no such framework is in place. There is,
however, a good deal of justifiable optimism because of organizations
such as the 1996 International Organization for Standardization's ("ISO")
14000 series standards. These are limited . and entirely voluntary
standards, which are not currently enforceable. The standards were
adopted covering environmental management systems, environmental
auditing, labeling, and environmental performance evaluation. The
management standard would have corporations adopting, voluntarily, a set
of basic standards of operation relating to environmental issues. This is
sufficiently broad in nature as to suit itself to integration with each state's
domestic laws-and to encourage those laws to emulate the standards.
284
In addition to the absence of a basic framework, observers of the
dispute resolution processes in the WTO and under NAFTA cannot help
283 As briefly discussed in Section I, supra, sources of international law on
environmental issues are more likely to constitute "soft law" rather than "hard law."
Hard law on the environment is primarily contained in treaties and, in "customary law"
when and as it is developed. "The impressive strides that the international community
has made in dealing with global environmental problems ... have come about through
traditional legal mechanisms such as treaties, progressive development of customary law,
and various forms of 'soft' legal processes." Richard J. McLaughlin, Sovereignty, Utility
and Fairness. Using US. Takings Law To Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing
Approach to Global Environmental Disputes in the WTO, 78 OR. L. REV. 855, 899-900
1999).
84 For a discussion of ISO standards, see generally Robert Clifford, ISO 14000: The
Work I Progress, 3 ALBANY ENVTL L. OUTLOOK, No. 2. 5 (1997); Christopher Bell &
Evan van Hook, Practical Considerations in Implementing ISO 14001, 3 ALBANY ENVTL
L. OUTLOOK, No. 2, 11 (1997).
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but be struck by the "ad-hocean" nature of the proceedings, 285 the resultant
loss of not only a precedential base, but also of the certainty of expectation
so necessary to both business/development interests and the successful
implementation of intra-sovereign environmental regulatory regimes.
286
This is not to suggest that one over-arching universal, international
environmental regulatory regime be installed. Such a thing may never be
possible-and may not be at all desirable. Many regulations already exist
via the multitude of treaties already in place and, as discussed, the many
developments in customary law that are already in place. It seems only
sensible, as well, that any top-down over-arching regulatory regime would
be less likely to succeed than a regime that combined regulation,
jurisprudence, market mechanism tools, voluntary compliance, continued
technological and scientific research and development, and extensive
educative knowledge dissemination.
The adoption of a very basic threshold level environmental code
could go a long way toward developing credible jurisprudence. What that
code would incorporate is beyond the scope of this Note, but basic
principles of equity-including compensation for those asked to bear
inordinate shares of responsibility for "our" environmental needs-should
be incorporated to create a fair-just and right-framework.
Compensation for a truly onerous burden asked of an entity-be it
an individual, corporation, or sovereign state-would seem to be a basic
equitable requirement for such a code.
The duty to compensate in such cases should however, not obtain
in all situations where any regulatory taking occurs, for two simple
reasons: one, impracticability; and two, the clear in-equities resulting
were we to compensate for negligible takings or deliberately harmful
activities.
As to "negligible" takings, obviously where there is no lasting
harm to the property owner or little economic damage, no 'compensation
should be paid. In these situations however, no unnecessarily fine
285 For discussions of the ad-hoc nature of dispute decisions in the WTO,' see
McLaughlin, supra note 283. With respect to similar information concerning NAFTA,
see Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at
Section 3.
286 Certainty of outcome can never be absolute, and a certain level of "ad-hoceanism" is
inevitable-and, for many reasons-often desirable. But some level of certainty .is
important to both sides in the development vs. the environment debate. For an excellent
discussion re the importance of certainty to both "sides," see, e.g., Gaetan Verhoosel,
Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies:
Striking A "Reasonable" Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 451 (1998).
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distinctions should be drawn, such as results in the appearance of
arbitrariness or inequities among those similarly situated. For example,
the negligible harm in Loretto (see supra, Section II D) was entitled to
compensation because of the "physical invasion" involved by the cable
companies' installation of equipment, but the severe economic loss in
Allard (see supra, Section II D), in which the plaintiffs right to sell his
artifacts was taken away from him and he was not compensated.
Awarding compensation for negligible harms while refusing same for
substantive damages seems arbitrary and creates an appearance of
unfairness. This is not to suggest that the "physical invasion" rule should
be abandoned or that Loretto should not have been paid-it is to suggest
that inequities cannot be allowed.
As to landowners-or corporations or sovereigns-who
deliberately create harm, it would seem inequitable to compensate them.
Cases of deliberate environmental malice would, at first blush, seem
farfetched. However, with the advances scientists have made in the study
of ecology, increasing degrees of knowledge must be imputed to states,
corporation and individuals with regard to the potential for diffuse
extraterritorial harms arising out of actions taken on their own property.
Any international framework adopted should include processes for
leveraging the knowledge factor so as to avoid the necessity of paying
compensation. Several existing tools could be put to expanded use in this
regard over time.
The developing notion of the universal commons or the "common
heritage of mankind" (discussed in Section I E supra) could be most
helpful in this regard. Certain areas of the earth-Antarctica, the deep
seas, etc.-are already recognized as Earth's common areas and are the
subject of various international agreements to protect them against usages.
harmful to all states. But much more needs to be done in this area. For
example, it is known that there needs to be a good deal of forest coverage
over the face of the earth. Using a universal commons theory, it might be
possible to build into the international environmental framework an agreed
upon number of forested acres to be maintained worldwide. Also needed,
is the maintenance of particular types of forest, including rainforests-and
we might do the same with those. The purposes of such a maintenance
agreement-global warming problems and habitat preservation come to
mind-could be acknowledged and agreed upon. Misuse of acreage
included in each nation's allotment of the worldwide total would therefore
become a knowledgeable act of harm, not requiring compensation.
Obviously, before such allotments were set, the basic North/South
argument would come into play. The developing nations who are asked to
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preserve, say, a rainforest, cannot fairly be asked to bear that burden after
the developing nations have'themselves created much of the earth's
current burden by destroying, in the process of their own development, too
much of their own forestry, thus creating a need to burden the developing
nation. Adjustments, including compensation, must, then, fairly be first
expected prior to identifying and beginning the protection of such
common areas.
Knowledge, or notice, would then provide exceptions for the
requirements for compensation in cases of severe harm by regulatory
taking. So too, should nuisance. Just as it has protected the development
of environmental regulation in the United States, nuisance can be brought
to bear on the development of international regulation. However, to avoid
the type of righteous backlash against regulation that has occurred in the
United States, care should be taken to avoid burdening individual entities
without compensation in situations where a new nuisance regulation
creates an onerous burden on an entity, who neither knew of the potential
for such regulation, had no previous notice of it, nor could reasonably be
expected to know or learn of it.
Compensation can take many forms, including trade-offs of
various sorts, and many forms of creative remuneration can and will be
devised in the future. We utilize creative forms of compensation at the
national security level (e.g., compensating North Korea for not producing
nuclear weapons) so there is no reason we cannot use the same
creativity-and sense of urgency-in devising compensatory
environmental agreements.
Another important significant lack in WTO and NAFTA dispute
resolution processes is the closed-door nature of both. The secrecy, lack
of openness to outsiders (including acceptance of amicus curiae briefs),
and non-public nature of the proceedings resulting in little media
reporting 287 all breed a distinct level of skepticism that is not conducive to
reasoned international environmental consensus, and, worse, can lead to
the types of frustrated backlash witnessed in Seattle during the 1999 WTO
meeting there where pro-environmentalists and others engaged in violent
street demonstrations. Openness to advice from reputable environmental
NGOs and scholarly thinkers could go a long way toward developing
international environmentalism. It might also help to improve the quality
of the decisions, which of course, is in turn dependent on the quality of the
jurists. Openness, public access and media coverage should lead to a
287 For a discussion of these factors, see, e.g., DePalma, supra note 285.
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demand for excellence and an accounting for failure to create, and/or
follow, precedent. It should also lead to a demand for clarity and a good
degree of certainty for both business development and for sovereign states
attempting to implement environmental regulations.
Perhaps, we may even arrive at a mutually acceptable answer to
the 1922 Holmesian question-When does regulation go too far?
